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COPYRIGHT AS A MODEL FOR FREE
SPEECH LAW: WHAT COPYRIGHT HAS IN
COMMON WITH ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY
LAWS, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
REBECCA TUSF1NET*
Abstract: Copyright raises real and troubling free speech issues, and
standard responses to those concerns are inadequate. This Article aims
to put copyright in the context of other free speech doctrine.
Acknowledging the link between copyright and free speech can help
determine the proper contours of a copyright regime that both allows
and limits property rights in expression, skewing the content of speech
toward change.
INTRODUCTION
What is "protected expression"? Suppose you write an article
criticizing a public official. If the government cannot prosecute you
for the article or award damages in a libel case brought by the official,
your speech is protected. On the other hand, if the government can
give you an injunction or award damages against someone who copies
the article, your speech is protected. So your speech can be protected
against the government, or by the government. These two common
meanings of protected expression are each found in different areas of
the law. Speech protected against the government is First Amendment
speech, and speech protected by the government is intellectual prop-
erty. The First Amendment declares that speech is .free, while' copy-
right means that people may be made to pay for speech. So, which is
it?
*Associate, I)ebevoise & Plimpton. I owe Mark Tushnet a great debt for his comments
and his self-restraint, and Jack Balkin for his assistance at every stage. Lawrence Lessig,
Richard Primus, Kim Roosevelt, Zachary Scitrag, and Tim Wu provided many helpful
comments. As I have doubts about the concept of independent authorship, responsibility
for any remaining errors is no more 'Mite than responsibility for any insights.. CO1nments
arc welcome at rebeccatgiuslinet.com .
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The conventional answer is both.' The First Amendment gets
government off speakers' backs, while the Copyright Act enables
speakers to make money from speaking and thus encourages them to
enter the private marketplace of ideas. But this apparently simple re-
lationship hides some profound tensions. When one speaker wishes to
use another's words, or even words that, taken as a whole, are "sub-
stantially similar" to someone else's words, the government may tell
her that she cannot. If she has printed books with those words in
them, her books may be seized and destroyed by U.S. marshals, or she
may be enjoined from trying to sell them. When such situations arise,
why does free speech apparently give way? 2
This Article aims to put copyright in a context of other free
speech doctrine. Part I considers how copyright raises real and trou-
bling free speech issues and why the standard responses to those con-
cerns are inadequate. 3 The conventional responses do not defend
copyright law because it promotes speech, but rather analyze copyright
as if it furthers a generalized legitimate government goal, one like
physical safety. From that perspective, the government is required to
pursue its legitimate interest without using means that impermissibly
trench upon free speech. The main aspects of copyright that prevent
it from impermissibly restricting free speech, in this view, are the
idea/expression dichotomy and the principle of fair use. This Part
argues that neither principle adequately addresses the free • speech
concerns generally thought relevant in other areas of free speech law.
Part I also sets forth potentially less restrictive alternatives to copyright
as we know it and rejects the argument that the First Amendment is
simply a property regime like copyright. Thus, Part I provides a cri-
See, e.g., Brief of Amiens Curiae• 	 Association of American Publishers, Inc., Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (No. 83-1632) ("Ulf the First
Amendment is the mural force of publishing, copyright is its commercial foundation, ,
[CI opyright and the First Amendment are essentially complementary."); Harvey S.
Perlman & Laurens H. Rhinelander, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States: Photocopying,
Copyright, and the judicial Process, 1975 SUP. Cr. REV. 355, 404 ("While the First Amendment
facilitates the flow of information by preventing government intervention, the - Copyright
system encourages the development of information and its dissemination by providing
incentives for publication. The conflict, if any, is in method not pu•pose."); Michael D.
Britten, Note, Constitutional fair Use, 20 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 85, 92 (1978) ("[C]opyright
seeks by actively encouraging what the first amendment seeks by strictly discouraging.").
2 Brief of Gannett Co. et al., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539 (1985) (No. 83-1632) ("Read literally, the First Amendment would invalidate the
Copyright Act"); see also Patti Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM.
REV. 983, 989 (1970); Alfred C. Yen. A Firs! Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Di-
chotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel,"38 EMORY L.J. 393, 393-94 (1989).
9 See infra notes 8-126 and accompanying text.
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tique of copyright from the perspective of standard First Amendment
theory, but its aim is not to demonstrate that copyright is or might be
unconstitutional. Rather, my goal is to make possible a rethinking of
standard First Amendment theory in light of copyright's constitution-
ality.
Part II sets forth the free speech justification for copyright. 4
Copyright is "the engine of free expression,"5 providing people with
property incentives to speak and disseminate speech. The argument
that copyright encourages speech may allow copyright to sweep fur-
ther than purely speech-suppressing regulations. But copyright is not
unique. Part II shows that the free speech issues raised by copyright
are related to controversial claims about free speech laws in other
contexts, such as hate speech, pornography, and campaign finance,
which makes the lack of controversy over copyright law even more of
a puzzle. These other arguments, concerning how private parties'
speech may suppress others' speech, have not been integrated into
prevailing free speech doctrine in the same way as the analytically
similar argument about copyright. Properly understood, copyright
can become the engine of free expression in a second sense: Not only
does it enable free speech, but copyright can drive free speech theory
in unexpected but important directions.
If we believe standard First Amendment theory, then we should
believe that copyright is unconstitutional because it is designed to
suppress some speech to generate other speech, a result the Supreme
Court condemned in the campaign finance context. But that would
be silly; copyright is constitutional, in large part because it does en-
courage speech by the people it protects. The problem is with the
standard theory: Government is already involved in shaping available
speech, and that's a good thing. Our objections to particular govern-
ment regulations—and there are valid ones—must he to their bias or
ineffectiveness, not to the mere fact of government action.
4 see
 infra notes 127-214 and accompanying text. This Article will not take up the de-
bate over how well copyright writ large serves to generate more speech. That debate has
been extensively addressed elsewhere. See, Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copy-
right: A Study of Copyright in Books. Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281
(1970); Robert M. Hurt & Robert N. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56
Am. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PRoc. 421 (1966); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright LaW, 181 LEGAL. STUD. 325 (1989). Instead, I will assume that,
in general, people will do more of what they can get paid for: That this may not be true at
the margin or in certain special cases will affect the boundaries of an ideal copyright re-
gime, not the overall justification for the existence of copyright.
5 Harper & Row Publishers, lnc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,558 (1985).
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The Supreme Court recognized the government's fundamental
involvement with creating the conditions for speech in the recent
Turner Broadcasting cases, which upheld a law requiring cable opera-
tors to carry local broadcast signals on some of their channels. 6 The
Turner cases offer a new way to evaluate government speech restric-
tions that are designed to promote certain kinds of speech. By requir-
ing substantial evidence in support of a legislative conclusion that
regulation will better promote speech than inaction, the Court is at-
tempting to balance issues of institutional competence with fears that
speech will be suppressed. The Turner analysis is different from most
First Amendment tests because it explicitly concerns itself with the
possibility that some speech will disappear if the state regulates, while
other speech will disappear in the absence of regulation.
Consistent with Throe); free speech doctrine should acknowledge
that the principles supporting copyright are applicable to other areas
of the law. Otherwise, copyright will remain a free speech anomaly, an
area of the law with a fully articulated speech-based justification that
nonetheless contradicts the rest of accepted doctrine, We should not
rest content with a copyright founded on special pleading.
Part III briefly applies the theory elaborated in the earlier parts
to a few aspects of copyright.? Essentially, we should recognize that
copyright's limits are as important as the rights it grants to property
owners in keeping "the engine of free expression" running properly.
Acknowledging the Iink between copyright and free speech can help
us determine the proper contours of a copyright regime that both
allows and limits property rights in expression, skewing the content of
speech toward change.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT AGAINST COPYRIGHT
Copyright gives the government authority to seize books and en-
join their sale, award damages against booksellers, or even send them
to jail. Following preliminary ex parte proceedings requiring only a
modest showing, federal marshals may seize works accused of in-
fringement and the machines used to - reproduce those works.8 The
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hereinafter Turner
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner
See infra notes 215-249 and accompanying text.
8See 17 U.S.C.§ 503(a) (1994) ("At any time while an action under this title is pending,
the court may order the impounding, on such terms as it may deem reasonable, of all cop-
ies or plionorecords claimed to have been made or used in violation of the copyright
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proceedings may be sealed so that the defendants will not get word of
what is being alleged before the marshals burst in. 9 If a jury finds that
the accused works are infringing by a preponderance of the evidence,
they may be destroyed.° These steps in the process of suppressing
copyright infringement are considered so routine and uninteresting
that opinions justifying them are rarely even published.'' If the
justification were anything other than copyright, these sweeping pow-
ers would be seen as a gaping hole at the heart of free speech rights.
In standard First Amendment scholarship, claims that speech be-
longs to no one and that willing listeners have a right to hear anything
they would like to hear are common. 12 The Supreme Court has held
that potential audiences are generally . not required to incur extra
costs to get speech that someone wants to supply them." This holding
owner's exclusive rights, and of all plates. molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or
other articles by means of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced.").
9See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v, Jasso, 927 F. Stipp. 1075 . (N.D. 111. 1996);
Century Home Entin't, Inc. v. Laser Beat, Inc., 859 F. Stipp. 636 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
19See 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1994).
liSer, e.g., U2 Home Entml, Inc. v. Sang Kim, No. 98—CV-4159, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17683 (ED. Pa. Nov. 4, 1998); Basquiat v. Baghoomian, No. 90—CIV-3853 (LJF), 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7622 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1992) (concerning books made by collecting a success-
ful artist's images); D.C. Comics, Inc. v. "John Doe" Nos. 1-25, No. 89-1669, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7398 (D.D.C. June 26, 1989) (granting blanket permission to search for and seize
allegedly infringing materials from street vendors in the District of Columbia); Worlds of
Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc., No. C86-2071, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15879
(ND. Ohio Dec.. 30, 1986); (f. Richard Harrington, Thawing a. New Crowd: Comics for the
Hock-end-Roll Generation, WAsn. PosT, Oct. 13, 1991, at G1 (discussing comic books about
the rock groups Bon Juvi and 11/4.1ot ley Crue that were destroyed as part of a settlement in an
infringement suit).
12 See, e.g., Gary Goodpaster, Equality and Free Speech: The Case Against Substantive Equal-
ity, 82 !own L. REV. 645, 673 (1997) (quoting CLAUDE LEFORT, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
THEORY 33 (David Macey trans., 1988)).
is The Court stated that:
We arc aWale of no general principle that freedom of speech may be abridged
when the speaker's listeners could come by his message by some other means,
sod' as seeking him out and asking him what ii is Not have we recognized
any such limitation on the independent right of the listener to receive the in-
formation soughs to be communicated.
Virginia Stale Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 757
n.15 (1976); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982)
(right to information on public events such as trials); Linmark Assoc. v. Township of Will-
ingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977) (right to receive commercial speech); Young v. American
Mini Theatre, 427 U.S. 50, 77 (1976) ("The central First Amendment concern remains the
need to maintain free access to the public to the expression."); Kleindienst v Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 760 (1972) (discussing the right to "receive information and ideas"): Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("IT] he people as a whole retain their
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of
6	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 42:1
should make copying a First Amendment activity, as a copier may of-
fer an alternative source of information that the audience wants and
can obtain more easily than by negotiating with the copyright owner. 14
Yet courts easily reject First Amendment claims in copyright
cases. 15 Free speech belongs to no one, but copyrighted speech be-
longs to someone. Robert Denicola and Melville Nimmer have under-
taken extensive defenses of copyright against First Amendment chal-
lenges; their work laid the foundations for any subsequent inquiry.' 6
They both recognize minor First Amendment limits on copyright in
highly important news material, but in general they find that copy-
right itself provides the necessary limits to address any concerns about
public access or free speech rights. Two internal limits have been
critical to their thinking, and to all who followed: the idea/expression
dichotomy and fair use. 17
Ilse First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)
(free speech includes the right to speak, the right to distribute, and the right to receive
speech).
14 See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, '3 (1987);
Harry N. Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimensions of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 790, 796-98 (1975); Lionel S. Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A
Gailwring Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 66 (1971).
15 See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978)
("[D]efendant's [First. Amendment] claim can be dismissed without a lengthy discus-
sion."); Schnapper v. Foley, 471 F. Stipp. 426, 428 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); McGraw-Dill, Inc. I.'. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Stipp. 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). Most commentators react similarly. See, e.g., Nil Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Joint
Hearing on H.R. 24-11 and S. 1284 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the
House Judiciary Comm. and the Senate Judiciary Gamut., 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of
Bruce Lehman, Commissioner of' Patents) ("The First Amendment has always provided a
completely different standard with regard to liability fur actions that constitute speech as
compared to actions that constitute copyright infringement. They're really just apples and
oranges.... [l]t does a disservice to both areas of law ... to analogize from one to the
other."). Although Professor Nimmer's important treatise on freedom of speech addresses
copyright, see MEtyn.t.E. B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 2-55 to 2-84 (Mil-
dew ed. 1984) thereinafter NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH], the best-selling constitutional
law casebook in the country devotes over 400 of its 1600-odd pages to freedom of expres-
sion, with only one sentence and three citations about copyright. See GEOFFREY R. STONE
ET AL., CoNsTiTuTioNm. LAW 1289 (2d ed. 1991).
16 See Robert Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protec-
tion of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283, 289-99 (1979); Melville B. Niminer, Does Copyright
Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180, 1190
(1970) I hereinafter Nimmer, Copyright].
17 While both Denicola and Nimmer were aware of copyright's speech-generating fea-
tures, they only used those features to prop tip the defense of idea/expression and fair use
as central speech-protective limits. Others examining the problem have similarly focused
on idea/expression and fair use. See, e.g., Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791,
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This Part addresses the claim that copyright's internal
configuration is sufficient to avoid a First Amendment challenge.
While Part II takes up the First Amendment-based argument for copy-
right, here I argue that non-speech arguments are insufficient on
their own to defend copyright against free speech criticisms. In Sec-
tion I.A., I show that the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use
defense do not eliminate free speech problems; if anything, they
make copyright seem even less supportable, a confusing body of law
likely to deter speakers from speech that might potentially be thought
to infringe. Section I.B. suggests some less restrictive alternatives to
copyright as we know it. The existence of such alternatives makes
copyright seem like an excessive, and thus unconstitutional, response
to the problem it was designed to solve. Filially, Section I.C. explains
that recent property-based visions of the First Amendment cannot
solve the problem by folding free speech law into a variant of an intel-
lectual property regime.
A. Standard Responses to First Amendment Claims Against Copyright
I. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
The idea/expression dichotomy, now embodied in § 102(b) of
the Copyright Act, holds that only expression can be copyrighted, and
not the idea, process, or other more general principle that underlies
the particular expression. 18 Because anyone who wishes can use the
ideas found in any copyrighted work, there is, it is said, no free speech
795-96 (9th Cir. 1992); Floyd Abrams. First Amendment and Copyright: The Serrenteenth Donald
C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 35 J. ComucHT Soc. I, 3-4 (1987); Celia Goldwag, Copyright
Infringement and the First Amendment, 29 Corvincurr L. Svmr. (ASCAP) 1,4 (1983); Wendy
J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: Tlw Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and
Encouragenum1 Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343,1383 n.189 (1989) [hereinafter Gordon, An
Inquiry into the Melitsl: David E. Shipley, Conflicts Between Copyright and the First Amendment
After Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 198(1 BYU L. Rns. 983.9 4,18, 1042.
Other ways in which the copyright law accommodates free speech concern are occasionally
mentioned, but they generally take a back seat to these two primary limits. See, e.g., Brief of
Gannett Co., Inc., supra note 2 (the exclusion of copyright for facts, the exclusion ibr
works of the U.S. government, and the originality requirement); Stephen Fraser, The
Conflict Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and Its Impact on the Internet, 16 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. U. 1,13 (1908) (facts); Goldstein, .supra note 2, at 1020-22 (original-
ity); Goldwag, supra, at 4-5 (limited duration of copyright and originality); Nintmer, Copy-
right, supra note 16, at 1193-96 (limited term).
" See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
8	 Boston College Len' Review 	 [Vol. 42:1
problem, as the copyright has not taken from the public domain any-
thing of First Amendment value. 119
a. The First Amendment Value of Expression
We tend to think of copiers, unlike other speakers, as pirates or
lazy people whose speech does not further free speech values. Our
image of a copier is not of an actor who recites a playwright's lines or
a local politico reciting the party platform, though these people copy
too. But, we assume that those people have the right to copy or need
no permission to do so, and so we don't examine their merit. We only
look at the value of unauthorized copies. While visceral reaction to
pirates is natural, it does not sufficiently distinguish a copier—particu-
larly one who is not copying wholesale and for profit—from other dis-
reputable, but protected, speakers. In general, the First Amendment
protects even speech which is not original to the speaker; 2° and the
Supreme Court has stated that it protects individuals' right "not only
to advocate their cause but also to select what they believe to be the
most effective means to advocate their cause." 21 "[Ais we know from
the example of publishing houses, movie theaters, bookstores and
Reader's Digest, communication occurs in selecting which speech to
copy and distribute no less than in creating the speech in the first
place."22
Speakers are allowed to choose their preferred modes of expres-
sion because altering expression could well change the meaning and
the impact of the message. Famously, the Supreme Court protected
" See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); see
also Air Pirates, 581 F.241 751; Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2c1 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977) ("The 'marketplace of ideas' is not limited by
copyright because copyright is limited to protection of expression."); Wainwright Sec. Inc.
v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977); Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 664 F.
Stipp. 1345, 1351 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environmental Action
Found., 199 U.S.I'.Q. (BNA) 630, 634 (D.D.C. 1977); NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra
note 15, §2,051C1, at 2-66 ("It is exposure to ideas, and not to their particular expression,
that is vital if self-governing people are to make informed decisions."); Denicola, supra
note 16, at 290-91; Ninuner. Copyright, supra note 16, at 1189-93; Pamela Samuelson, Reviv-
ing Zacchini: Analyzing Fiat Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57
Tut.. L. REV. 836, 881-83 (1983).
20 See Nininner, Copyright, supra mite 16, at 1181.
21
 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988).
22 Miner 1, 512 U.S. 622, 675 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in
part); see also 1-ledges v. Wauconda Canty United Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 E3d 1295, 1302 (7th
On 1993) ("A city may not limit booksellers to vending the works they write themselves; a
slate may not exclude newspapers printed outside its borders .... That adopting the ex-
pression of others is a form of speech we freely concede.").
December 20001	 Copyright as a ModelforFree Speech Law 	 9
Patti Cohen's right to wear a jacket proclaiming "Fuck the Draft" in
public.° The Court held that the expression can often constitute the
idea: "[W]e cannot indulge in the facile assumption that one can for-
bid particular words without also running a substantial risk of sup-
pressing ideas in the process."24
These words may seem inapplicable to copyright, where generally
the words are not suppressed but limited to a particular class of peo-
ple who pay to use them.25 But, if the owner will only authorize their
use in contexts that are favorable to the author, then the state is ena-
bling the owner to ensure that his expression will only have one
meaning and will not be available to use in oppositional ways. 2° This is
23 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971); see also Gugliehni v. Spelling-
Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 458 (Cal. 1979); Stanley higher, The Marketplace of Ideas: A
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. I, 34-36 (arguing that, because persuasion is not fully
rational, content and form are not separable in practice). Limits on use of another's ex-
pression may even be fundamentally offensive to a speaker's sense of self. When ID. Salin-
ger's biographer was sued for infringement for ginning Salinger's letters, he was asked why
he did not paraphrase the contents with neutral words that did not use Salinger's expres-
sion. He replied that he would be ashamed to put his name to such awkward and gutted
prose. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc.., 811 F.2d 90, 90-97 (2d Cir. 1987).
2 ' 1 See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
25 The idea/expression dichotomy :night be a kind of "manner" restriction, like regu-
lations that prohibit broadcasting any noise above a certain level. See. e.g.. Metromedia,
Inc. v. Safi Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). In the right of publicity context, the Tenth Circuit
recently dealt with a similar claim:
[Hit the context of intellectual property, [the] "no adequate alternative ave-
nues" test does not sufficiently accommodate the public's interest in free ex-
pression. Intellectual property, unlike real estate, includes the words, images
and sounds that we use to cOmmunicate.... Restrictions on the words or im-
ages that may be used by a speaker, therefbre, are quite different than restric-
tions on the time, place, or manner of speech.
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n., 95 17.3d 959, 971 (10th Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted). The idea/expression distinction fails the standard time, place and
manner test, which requires that a regulation be "justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech" and that "ample alternative channels for communication of the
information" remain. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
Protecting expression from copiers depends on the content of the speech, since non-
copied or Fairly used expression and facts arc all fair game; moreover. wherever a copier
can speak, she will not be allowed to use the particular words at issue. But cf, Robert Post,
Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. Rev. 1249, 1260-70 (1995) [hereinafter
Post, RecuperatingFirst Amendment Doctrine] (criticizing time, place and manner doctrine for
its incoherence and its propensity for authorizing ever-increasing government restrictions
on speech).
26 Copyright claims are obviously motivated by disagreement with a defendant's mes-
sage in sonic cases. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Scott, 82 17.3d 423 (11th Cir. 1996) (one of
a large number of cases brought by Scientology against critics); United Christian Scientists
v. Christian Science Bd. of Dirs., 829 F.2d 1152, 1156 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing at-
10
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troubling because an inability to use the most evocative expression
possible diminishes the power of a speaker's message. 27 The Supreme
Court has recognized that, if the government allows private parties
exclusive control over cable systems and then allows them to screen
out objectionable speech, the First Amendment may be violated. 28
The same argument can be made with respect to exclusive state-
backed control over expression. Moreover, a payment requirement
may put certain speech beyond the reach of a large group of speakers
and listeners, which is in itself troubling.
There are two related points here: First, the idea/expression di-
chotomy recognizes no value in preserving a "breathing space" for
free speech. In other areas, the Supreme Court has announced that
we must tolerate a certain amount of valueless, destructive speech,
because we want to avoid self-censorship by speakers who fear that
juries or judges might find them liable.29 If courts do not err on the
side of finding unprotectable ideas instead of protectable expression,
they run the risk of suppressing important speech.
Second, the relationship of ideas to expression explains why ex-
pression deserves strong First Amendment protection. Even if we are
confident in theory that a thesaurus and some thought will produce
an alternate way to say almost anything with almost as much grace,
courts never actually make this inquiry and it would be hard to imag-
ine them doing so. To decide whether it is possible to express a par-
ticular idea in a different way, we have to determine what is idea-ish
about the idea and what is its expressive raiment. That is, we would
have to decide what Leaves of Grass says and how to say it in another
way while still communicating its exact idea. There will be nearly as
many different answers to this question as there are readers, and that
is what makes Leaves of Grass so very protectable. Similarly, "It's morn-
tempts by one group of Christian Scientists to use copyright to block the distribution of
another group's unorthodox version of Mary Raker Eddy's writings); Maxtone-Graham v.
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986) (pro-choice author sued anti-choice author for
copyright infringement based on a quotation). In Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 137 F.R.D. 372
(D. Utah 1991), a manufacturer tried to use copyright to protect 90,000 pieces of litigation
documents from dissemination by the media in order to prevent public access to We po-
tentially embarrassing contents of those documents.
27See Intl Olympic C0111 M. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 789 F.2d 1319, 1321
(1986) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
28 See Denver Area Ed. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 768 (1996).
rr See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (citation omitted) (finding
that We First Ainendment required an actual malice standard for intentional infliction of
emotional distress by a parody in a magazine in order "to give adequate 'breathing space'
to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.").
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ing in America" is important for its expressive power in making a po-
litical point. The law protects expression (in free speech and copy-
right) because, in fact, expression is what makes speech worthwhile.
Thus, it is incorrect to say that there is no First Amendment value in
"expression," as opposed to ideas.
Yet copyright is reconciled to free speech with the claim that ex-
pression does not mean all that much to our shared artistic, intellec-
tual, and political lives. The idea/expression dichotomy is troubling
because it denigrates the value of expression while still attempting to
justify the legal protection of expression as property. We protect ex-
pression from copying not because expression is unimportant to the
free flow of ideas, as the idea/expression dichotomy suggests, but be-




FREEDOM OF SPEECH, StipM note 15, § 3.01. at 3—G to —9. The difficulty of
denying expression's value has been recognized by defenders of the idea/expression dis-
tinction who have felt compelled to make exceptions for special cases. Melville Nimmer
identifies limited cases in which "t lie 'idea' of a work contrilnnes almost nothing to the
democratic dialogue, and it is only its expression which is meaningful." Nimmer, Copyrighi,
supra note 16, at 1197. He suggests that this is obviously true of much graphic art, t !lough
copyright should still protect artworks because society generally has little need of free
copying of such works. See id. In the case of very important pictorial representation of
newsworthy events, though, an exception should he Made: copyright should not allow an
author to control photographs of an event like die My Lai massacre. See id. at 1197-98.
Unfortunately. what is important enough to cpialify for this exception will he highly uncer-
tain, like the rest of the infringemetit lest.
There is also a subtle contradiction between the overall theory of free speech put
forth by scholars such as Nimmer and the proposal to make exceptions for expression in
really significant cases. For Nimmer, news pictures are more important 10 a democratic
dialogue than verbal reports, no matter how eloquent. because people perceive pictures
differently than words. If this is a correct Understanding of how humans process informa-
tion, however, then Ninimer's underlying continitinent to rational self-government as the
fundamental purpose of the First Amendment becomes more troublesome. If we are crea-
tures who cannot reduce some of mu• deepest reactions to words, if our politics has to
transcend minis and look to symbols at crisis points, then we are not really talking about
rational, coolly deliberative self-government. A picture is nut an argument. If that picture
is nonetheless vital to democratic sell-governance, then maybe direct, point-by-point politi-
cal argument is not the central value of speech. And if that is the case, then Nimmer's
central distinction between politically important and decorative speech begins to break
down:
Sonic of the most influential forces in our culture do 1101 make an argument
or appeal to the intellect: music, visual art, and a great deal of advertising (in-
cluding political advertising) contribute to the "marketplace of ideas"
through sound, imagery, and nonrational appeals 10 passion and desire. It
would be difficult to say that a Madonna concert makes a strictly rational "ar-
gument," yet Madonna's "communications" have had at least as great au ef-
fect on our culture and political life as most books of analytic philosophy or




The argument that piracy is not valuable speech depends on the
idea that a particular speaker is low-value, regardless of the actual con-
tent of the copied speech. The same speech by different (authorized)
speakers would deserve the full range of constitutional protection.
Speaker-based discrimination is not unknown to First Amendment
law. The Supreme Court has, for example, approved a preference for
broadcasters over cable operators in certain circumstances.n But
speaker preferences usually require the government to demonstrate
that it is not discriminating on the basis of content or viewpoint and
that it has a good reason for its actions." At the least, speaker-based
discrimination should put a heavier burden of justification on copy-
right.
Even assuming that the use of someone else's words provides a
speaker only minor convenience, avoiding copying still burdens her
speech somewhat. Generally, the state cannot impose liability on a
speaker simply to protect another private party's interests. In Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, the Supreme Court
struck down a requirement that an electric company allow a con-
sumer group to insert material in its billing envelopes." While the
electric company had no "right to be free from vigorous debate... it
[did] have the right to be free from government restrictions that
abridge its own rights in order to 'enhance the relative voice' of its
opponents."34 Justice Marshall, concurring, wrote that: "[w]hile the
interference with appellant's speech is, concededly, very slight, the
State's justification—the subsidization of another speaker chosen by
the State—is insufficient to sustain even that minor burden." 35 One
might distinguish Pacific Gas & Electric Co. because the Court faced a
political science.... [O]ne cannot restrict First Amendment protection to
the rational or "cognitive" without ignoring what works as persuasion in pub-
lic discourse and vastly expanding the government's power to censor.
David Cole, Playing by Pornography's Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. PA. L.
Rev. 111, 125-26 (1994). Nimmer is of course entirely aware of the difficulty of determin-
ing what speech is important to self-governance, and he holds that overtly nun-political
speech serves valuable First Amendment goals. See NIMMER, FREEDOM OE SPEECH, supra
note 15, § 3.01, at 3-6 to 3-9.
st See Turner!!, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
32 1 discuss good reasons for copyright below; the point here is that courts don't
bother to make such an inquiry in copyright cases.
33 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986).
31 Id. at 14 (plurality opinion).
35 Id. at 24 (citations and footnote omitted) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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situation in which a speaker was forced to subsidize an enemy of that
speaker's viewpoint. A copier, arguably, is not an enemy of a speaker's
viewpoint. Thus, copyright does not restrict speech in order to en-
hance the relative voice of another, but restricts speech to let a view-
point-identical but rights-holding speaker prevail.
This is not what really happens in many significant copyright
cases, however. J.D. Salinger's biographer, for example, hardly shared
Salinger's viewpoint, and yet was found to have infringed because he
quoted Salinger's letters. Similarly, extensive quotations from L. Ron
Hubbard's published and unpublished writings justified a finding of
infringement in the Second Circuit, though those quotes were used
precisely to show what a fraud Mr. Hubbard was. Here we seem to
have speakers whose words (including their illustrative quotations
from their targets) are being suppressed to enhance the relative
voices of their opponents.
• Copiers also add expression, as the Nation did when it excerpted
parts of Gerald Ford's biography as part of a story on what the biog-
raphy revealed about White House politics." The underground car-
toonists of Air Pirates created twisted caricatures of innocent Disney
characters that required time, thought, and creativity," as did a com-
mentary on the O.J. Simpson murder trial clone in the style of Dr.
Seuss. 38 All were found to infringe. Particularly when it collies to non-
literal copying, courts may be incapable of deciding what constitutes
"opposition" to a copyright owner's viewpoint. What was Andy Warhol
saying with those Campbell's soup cans, anyway? How many sides does
an issue of artistic judgment have?
We could say that the expression taken by a copier is not valuable
as speech, even if the rest of what she says is. (Of course, it is valuable
as property, which is a bit embarrassing to the theory of value.) Thus,
the law states that no pirate can defend against a claim of infringe-
ment by showing how much she created herself." Yet other areas of
free speech law resist such a conclusion. The test for obscenity, for
example, requires. that a work as a whole must lack literary, artistic, po-
36 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 5311 (1985).
37 See Air Pimies, 581 F.2d at 758.
" See	 Senss Enters. v. Penguin Rooks USA, Jnc., 109 F.3(11394 (911i Cir. 1997).
" See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 Eal 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992) ("I o collier may defend
the act of plagiarism by pointing out how much of the copy he has not pirated."); Sheldon
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) (L. hand. J.) ("True, much
of the picture owes nothing to the play; ... but that is entirely immaterial; it is enough that
substantial parts were lifted; no plagiarist call excuse the wrong by showing how much of
his work he did not pirate.").
14	 Boston College Law Review
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litical or scientific value in order that it may constitutionally be sup-
pressed. Accused purveyors of obscenity can defend themselves by
showing how much they created that was not obscene. In defamation
and libel law, inaccurate statements of fact—even those made with
knowledge or reckless disregard for their falsity—are constitutionally
protected if the overall work is "substantially correct" or lacks 'nal-
ice.40
 In other words, defendants accused of defamation can prevail by
showing how much of their work was true or in good faith.
The usual justification for looking at an accused work as a whole
is that courts fear a chilling effect. If a fragment of a work could be
punished for violating some prohibition, publishers would have a
much more difficult time determining what was allowable; they would
have to scrutinize each paragraph for possible offense if taken in iso-
lation. Publishers would also be unable to rely on the overall message
of the work, even though works are normally consumed in their en-
tirety rather than as disconnected passages. 41 The reported cases in
which using small amounts of another's copyrighted expression in a
larger work led to liability are disturbing, because they allow suppres-
sion of an entire work for a small taint. 42
We could conceive of the low-value speech argument in this way:
Free speech law recognizes a certain set of facts about the world as
4C° See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1991) (holding
that the law of libel overlooks minor inaccuracies and requires analysis of the challenged
article as a whole); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286 (1964) (holding that
the fact that a published account was "substantially correct" provided a complete defense
to a defamation claim even if parts were wrong); Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F.3d
310, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that most of the allegations offered to support a par-
ticular conclusion were true so- that one false allegation was not actionable even if mali-
ciously made).
41 See Saint Surin v. Virgin Islands Daily News, Inc., 21 F.3d 1309, 1317 (3d Cir. 1994)
("Words take on meaning in the company of other words. They are gregarious. They take
on tone and color front syntax and context. In defamation actions, words should be Con-
strued as they would be understood by the average reader.").
42 See, e.g., Ringgold v. Blac1;Entin't Television, 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that
a preliminary injunction might be appropriate against a television show that displayed
portions of a copyrighted poster in the background for 26 seconds total); Woods v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Stipp. 62 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding the film Twelve Monkeys
infringing because it used a copyrighted image of a chair); Aieleen Fajardo, Holy Case of
Copyright Infringement, Batman!, 4 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 268 (1997) (discussing a similar case
over use of artwork in the fihn Batman); Francis X. Clines, Creator of Religious Art Prevails in
Devil'F N.Y. TurtEs, Feb. 14, 1998, at A6 (discussing lawsuit against the film Devil's Advo-
cate for containing an image of a sculpture reminiscent of a sculpture on the National Ca-
thedral). But see Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Stipp. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(finding fair use in a momentary use of copyrighted photographs as background in the
film Seven).
December 20001
	 Copyright as a Model forFlee Speech Law	 15
relevant when deciding whether or not certain speech is regulable;
those facts are not contained in speech but determine the level of
protection such speech gets. For example, whether a person is a pub-
lic or a private figure will determine whether negligent misstatements
of fact about that person will subject a speaker to liability. 43 Whether
an exhortation to kill is made in a play or by one mobster to another
will determine whether the speaker is guilty of criminal conspiracy. It
could be that whether a speaker has paid the requisite fee to a copy-
right owner is that kind of fact." Facts are relevant when they prove or
disprove the existence in a particular case of the harms against which
a speech regulation is directed.° The fact that a person has paid a fee
to a copyright owner proves that there is no risk that her speech will
negatively affect the incentives of future speakers to create copy-
rightable expression, or the fact that her appropriation was
sufficiently transformative proves that punishing her would not serve
the goal of encouraging new speech. But this justification is not based
on any inherent feature of expression as opposed to ideas; it is a facet
of the speech-based justification for copyright, which I take up in Part
IL
c. Self-Fulfillment and Stability
First Amendment theorists have suggested that copyright in-
fringement does not serve any value that free speech is generally
thought to further. Lack of originality supposedly means that copying
does not serve a self-fulfillment function, in which the speaker ex-
43 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
44 Once we scrutinize copyright with an eye to its relationship to free speech, Robert
Post's claim that there is no one "free speech principle" duo jiist Hies Ilte entire set of rights
generally called "freedom of speech" seems much inure persuasive. See ROBERT C. POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT Its (1995); Post,
Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, supra note 25, at 1271-73. Conventional candidates
for such an overarching principle such as "distrust of government regulation," see Geoffrey
R. Stone, Autonomy and Distrust, 64 U. Cow. L. REV. 1171,1178 (1993), and "individual
self-realization," see Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593
(1982), do not Seem to fit all that well into an area of law that holds that all speech shonld
be free, as long as it is not owned by someone else.
45 Cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484.501 (1996) (plurality opinion)
("Men a State regulates commercial messages to protect COIISUIIICES from misleading,
deceptive, or aggressive sales practices ... the purpose of its regulation is consistent with
the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore
justifies less than strict review.").
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presses that which is most herself. 46 Likewise, no one is going to riot
over a copyright dispute, and so there is no "safety valve" function in-
volved.47
The self-fulfillment and stability arguments are not very persua-
sive. The self-fulfillment point fails to look closely at the practices that
many people actually do find fulfilling: expressing their commitment
to certain cultural, political, or social groups in conventional and even
stylized ways." Indeed, the more that a member of a group adheres to
that group's script, the "better" a member she often is. Just as a per-
sonal choice protected by the First Amendment can consist of giving
allegiance to an extant faith—choosing to be a Catholic or a Demo-
crat rather than developing one's own religion or political party—
autonomy interests are also served when a person chooses to copy
what someone else has said, endorsing it as her own. 49 Speech is not
guaranteed only to the well-educated, with thesauruses at their
fingertips, or the creative 50
46 See United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Stipp. 1265, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 1974) (`We do not
find any denial of freedom of expression to the 'tape pirate', What he seeks is not the
freedom to express himself artistically or otherwise, but the right to make exact and iden-
tical copies of sound recordings produced by others.'); NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH,
supra note 15, § 2.05[C], at 2-67; Goldwag, supra note 17, at 7 ("One who appropriates the
expression of another is not engaging in self-fulfillment; rather, he is appropriating an-
other's labor without exerting any effort"); Sobel, supra note 14. at 72; Leonard W. Wang,
Note, The First Amendment Exception to Copyright: A Proposed 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 1158,
1181.
47 See NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, sepia note 15, § 2.05[C], at 2-66 to 2-67; Sobel,
supra note 14, at 73.
48 See JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF 'rue PERFORMATIVE 27, 39
(1997) (discussing the ways in which using conventionalized expressions can actually in-
crease the power of speech by evoking well-known associations). Professor Ninamer, who
makes the argument that copying serves no self-fulfillment interest, writes in that IT here
may be no audience at all, and yet the self-fulfillment function will sometimes be served by
engaging in some forms of speech. An example of this is the satisfaction that may be expe-
rienced by singing a song aloud although there is no one to hear." NIMMER, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH, sepia note 15, § 1.03 at 1-50. Though he might be imagining that the lone singer
has composed her own song, he probably isn't. and she probably hasn't. She enjoys her
performance nonetheless, just as many people gain fulfillment by retelling stories they
have heard before, see JAN HAROLD BRUNVAND, THE VANISHING HITCHHIKER: AMERICAN
URBAN LEGENDS AND THEIR MEANINGS (1981), or even by making up stories about popu-
lar (copyrighted) television and movie characters, see HENRY JENKINS, TEXTUAL POACHERS:
TELEVISION FANS AND PARTICIPATORY CULTURE (1992); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions:
Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.Rev. 651 (1997).
49 See, e.g., Stanton by Stanton v. Brunswick Sch. Delft, 577 F. Stipp. 1560 (D. Me.
1984) (graphic quote from Time describing capital punishment could not be barred from a
yearbook simply because it was powerfid).
5° As noted by the Colorado Supreme Court:
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The extension of protection to every speaker, however derivative,
can be justified by reference to general democratic theory, which val-
ues the contribution of each citizen to the political process.m The
more people vote the better, even though they may well be choosing
between only two options. The truth is that most equal, autonomous,
choosing individuals do not have much revelatory to say; they con-
tribute by participating, not by breaking new ideological ground. A
person who recites John Stuart Mill chapter and verse is doing at least
as much to further political discourse as someone who composes an
original ode to liberalism. The Mill disciple will not contribute much
to democratic dialogue if she is not in a position to offer cogent re-
sponses to questions front the people to whom she speaks. Even her
ability to marshal quotations, however, is a contribution, since persua-
siveness is not the test for protected speech. 52 Moreover, a speaker's
belief that Mill's words are appropriate to a particular political situa-
tion is itself a valuable interpretation of Mill, just as a politician who
quotes the Bible in debate is taking a particular religious and political
stance."
The ideas expressed by defendant's conduct may seem to some to be . juvenile
and inarticulate, and perhaps his actions are subject to interpretations other
than we have given, but this does not strip his "speech" of constitutional pro-
tection. The First Amendment is not the exclusive property of the educated
and politically sophisticated segment of our population; it is not limited to
ideas capable of precise explication.
Colorado v. Vaughan, 514 P.2d 1318, 1322 (Colo. 11173); see also Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) ("[A] narrow, succinctly artiett-
table message is not a condition of constitutional protection."); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Canty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 505 (1969) (black armband signifying opposition to Viet-
nam War was protected speech despite lack of specific message); higher, mrpra note 23, at
33-34 (discussing how bans on disruptive speech are biased against the poor, the ill-
educated, and social outcasts).
6t
	 Ingber, supt-t7 note 23, at 11.
52See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 120 S. CI. 897. 919 11.3 (2000)
(Thomas,,)., dissenting) ("We regularly hold that speech is protected when the underlying
basis for a position is not given.").
53 I am not claiming that democracy is the only real justification for free speech. My
point is dim even a Meiklejohnian democracy-promoting theory, which often seents to
limit the scope of the First All1C11(1111ent, does not justify excluding copying from the realm
of protected speech activities. Meiklejohn did not think that it was important for everyone
to speak, only that everything worth hearing be said. In that sense, his self-governmem
theory is consistent with copyright. But speeds worth hearing and copyright owners'
speech will only overlap if copyright succeeds in the work I describe in Part 11: generating
new speech. Self-government is therefore unable to justify copyright without reference to
copyright's speech-promoting function. It) addition, the controls on dissemination that
copyright allows may prevent people from receiving worthwhile speech.
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As for the safety valve argument, it is probably true that there has
never yet been a riot over the suppression of copyright infringement.
But it is equally true that there has yet to be a riot over the suppres-
sion of books from school libraries or any number of speech restric-
tions that nonetheless were deemed impermissible; because of its
speculative nature, the safety valve argument is .generally a
makeweight. And if we widen the criteria for what counts as a safety
valve to include speech acts that prevent alienation from government
and disrespect for the law, 54
 copyright appears to be clogging a fair
number of safety valves. Outrage at the apparent scope of copyright
law and a declared intent to violate that law are reasonably prevalent
on the Internet, 55
 where people are more likely to publicize their dis-
satisfaction than when they are denied the ability to copy at Kinko's. 56
That such outlaws most likely will never be sued probably does not
make them respect the broad scope of the law, and the randomness of
enforcement may worsen the problem. This is certainly not a reason
to reject copyright, but it does suggest that safety valve concerns are
not absent in the area. 57
54
 Such widening could be defended on the grounds that the traditional articulation
of the safety valve justification assumes a particular kind of speaker, namely a relatively
powerful (white male) speaker who feels that he has the option of violence if he cannot say
what he wants to say. See, e.g., Cynthia Giant Bowman, Street Hara-ssment and the Informal
Ghettoization of 1Thmen, 106 1Luiv. L. REV. 517, 560-4U (1993); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The fustice of Rules and Standards, 106 DAR N% L. REV. 22,
42 (1992). Other kinds of speakers :night react in different, but also damaging, ways, such
as sabotage.
55 See, e.g., The Free Musk Philosophy (V 1.1), at lutp://www.ram.org/ramblings/philo-
so/illy/611).10ml
 (List visited Mar. 31, 1998); Negativland, Fair Use, at littp://www.negativ-
latul.com/fairuse.html (last visited Mar. 31, 1998); Negativland, Stuff, at Imp://www.neg-
ativland.com/nmol/negmiscimul
 (last visited Mar. 31, 1998) (advertising T-shirt with the
logo "Copyright Infringement Is Your Best Entertainment Value"); The Viral Communica-
tions Anti-Copyright Policy, at littp://www.cyborganic.com/people/vir-comm/projects/anti-
copy/
 (last visited Mar. 31, 1998).
56 See Wendy j. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual
Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. Rev. 853, 85511.13 (1992) ("iLlegal prohibitions against copying
pose noneconomic dangers that private modes of fencing-off do not, such as creating in
the user population a perception of governmental compulsion, which could give rise to a
species of resentment"); cf. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 17, at 1345-46
(1989) (describing average consumers' feeling that justice allows them to copy tapes they
own or tape music off the air).
57Another related argument concerns the "checking value" of free speech. Vincent
Blasi suggests that "the abuse of official power is an especially serious evil—more serious
than the abuse of private power, even by institutions such as large corporations which can
affect the lives of millions of people." Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 Am. II. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 538. Maybe we shoukl not be so concerned about
private parties' control over the content of expression for that reason. This argument does
December 20001	 Copyright as a Model for Flee Speech Law 	 19
d. Vagueness and Subjectivity
Another basic problem with using the idea/expression dichot-
omy to resolve free speech concerns is that the distinction between an
idea and the concrete form it takes is entirely too vague. 58 Indeed, the
most fanaous and well-received explanation of the dichotomy appeals
to its vagueness. Judge Learned Hand wrote:
Upon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the inci-
dent is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the
most general statement of what the work is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this
series of abstractions where they are no longer protected,
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his
"ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is
never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that
boundary, and nobody ever can. 59
It is unsurprising, then, that judges often disagree amongst them-
selves about when it is necessary to use a particular fragment of ex-
pression or whether the idea could have been expressed in some
other, noncopying way.6° Particularly since infringement can be found
not answer the question of witat level of scrutiny to give to copyright: Public violence limy
be worse at its worst than private violence, but private abuse is worth considering. See Gold-
stein, supra note 2, at 997 (discussing the private monopoly power of large corporations
with control over many copyrights); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell. Freedom of Speech
and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE U. 2431 (1998) (suggesting
that private enforcement may be more dangerous to speech because it may be more perva-
sive and effective).
58 See Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV.
321, 398 (1989) rile idea-expression dichotomy simply dues not lend itself to ... precise
and easy application.... Even in the definition of what is idea and what is expression. die
doctrine probably incorporates just as many perplexing issues as does the first amendment
itself."); Yen, supra note 2, at 396-97; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman. Information as Speech,
Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Illarkrtplace.s and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 665, 709 (1992).
Nicl tots v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 1 7,2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); so alua Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) ("'flu: lest for in-
fringement of copyright is of necessity vague. ... Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad
hoc.... [(]ue cannot say how far an nil it a tot' must depart from an undeviating reproduc-
tion to escape infringement.").
60 Sec. e.g.. Triangle PubEns, Inc. v. Knight-Kidder Newspapers. Inc., 626 F.2d 1171,
1181 (5111 Cir. 1980) (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing
with the claim that the Idea" of a TV Guide cover merged with its 'expression" and claim-
ing that the idea could have been represented without reproducing an actual TV Guide
cover).
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even without verbatim copying, in cases of "substantial similarity," it is
difficult to distinguish idea from expressionP Worsening the uncer-
tainty, the modern idea of a work's "total concept and fed" allows a
finding of infringement when the overall mood of two works is essen-
tially the same, despite the fact that there might be no single element
that is literally copied. 62 Neil Netanel suggests that the problem of
sorting idea from expression has become even less tractable now that
derivative works—works based on other copyrighted works such as a
film inspired by a novel—are explicitly protected. 63
A vague law that restricts speech is usually thought to be uncon-
stitutional. Confused and uncertain, speakers will "'steer far wider of
the unlawful zone' than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were
clearly marked."64
 A standard that freely admits that one case will
never provide much guidance for the next case seems about as had a
guide to safe conduct as one could imagine. Faced with a potentially
devastating lawsuit, speakers will be well-advised to steer as far as pos-
sible away from any arguable copyright infringement, to spare them-
selves the risks of going before a judge or jury, and they should care-
fully limit the expression of those for whom they may be vicariously
liable.65
 The potential chilling effect is thus particularly great when
speakers, to reach an audience, need the help of publishers or inter-
61 See Brinell, 3Upril note 1, at 78; Leslie A. Kurtz, .Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expres-
sion in Copyright, 47 U. MtAtut L. REv. 1221, 1228, 1232-35 (1993).
62 See, e.g., Ski & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110
(9th Cir. 1970); Yen, SUP?, note 2, at 410-11.
63 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE Li 283,
304 (1996).
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S 360, 372 (1964) (citation omitted); see also Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (footnotes and internal quotes omitted) ("[Wiltere
a vague statute abtu[sl upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it oper-
ates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.").
65 See Yen, supra note 2, at 425. Yen argues that copyright cases are more dangerous
than libel and defamation cases becatise juries Gut u nderstand concepts of falsity, malice,
and recklessness more easily than they can tease out the difficult line between idea and
expression. A copyright jury will be unpredictable, and thus pose a greater threat of chill-
ing speech. See id. at 426; see also Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 57, at 2439 ("No long-
standing social consensus tells us ivhat is 'idea' and what is 'expression'; no intuitively ob-
vious line divides the two categories."). My argument is similar to that made by some
recent critics of sexual harassment law. See Kingsley R. Browne, Workplace Censorship: A Re-
sponse to Professor Sangree, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 579, 581-82 (1995); Eugene Volokh, Freedom
of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1811-12 (1992).1 take no posi-
tion here 011 Browne and Volokh's criticisms of Title VII; 1 merely wish to suggest that
copyright, which sweeps fm - more broadly than harassment law and is unlimited in poten-
tial subject matter, presents great incentives to limit speech.
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net service providers, whose institutional interests make one particu-
lar speaker's material not terribly important compared to a threat of
legal action for infringement or contributory infringement. 66
Subjective standards for distinguishing between unlawful appro-
priation and legitimate citation in copyright cases are also suspect on
free speech grounds. The influential Ninth Circuit infringement test
requires first an objective evaluation of the similarity of two works,
then a subjective evaluation. 67 Yet the Supreme Court has sharply lim-
ited the' availability of actions for intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on speech, holding, that the distinction between outra-
geous and non-outrageous opinion "has an inherent subjectiveness
about it" that would allow defendants to be held liable just because of
a jury's "tastes" or preferences. 68 This concern is consistent with
vagueness law's fear of decisions made "on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory ap-
plication."69 A jury's subjective evalution of similarity may he very
difficult to predict."
One could argue that infringement cases are unlikely to be sys-
tematically biased against the opinions of out-groups, whereas judg-
66 See, e.g., the X-Philes/Millenion Protest at http://database.simplenet.com/x/pro-test .
Mini (last visited Oct. 30, 2000) (discussing an incident in which the Fox Network sent a
threat letter to a university because of a student's web page, and the university cut off the
student's interim access); cf. Browne, supra note 65; VolokIc. supra note 65 (arguing that
an employer's interests diverge from its employees' such that employers will suppress a
broad range of employee speech in order to avoid the risks of a lawsuit). The Digital Mil-
'cilium Copyright Act limits online providers' liability for users' infringeinent if they take
down the accused material promptly. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1994). Though users can allege
that their tnaterial is not infringing, the new law seems unlikely to change the basic dy-
namic..
See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990). This test has evolved from what
was earlier labeled an "extrinsic" and an "intrinsic" test of similarity, See Sid & Marty Krofft
'Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1157. But it has maintained the two-step process of analytic
dissection and then subjective, ordittary-observer comparison of the protected and alleg-
edly infringing works.
GH Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
G9 Grayned v. City of Rockford:408 U.S. 104, 109 (1971).
" Though the government does not often enforce the criminal copyright law, thus
perhaps reducing the dangers of biased prosecution, the existence of a private right of
action creates a large potential kw arbitrary litigation, compounding the risks of the sub-
jective test. The case law suggests that one may more readily criticize the Church of Latter-
Day Saints using Mormon documents without fear of litigation than one may criticize Sci-
entology using the same methods. See, e.g., Religious Mat Ch:, 82 17.3d at 423. Similarly, Dis-
ney engages in aggressive copyright enforceinott, while Paramount is fat more lenient for
uses of its Star eh characters and situations. Varying private responses, whether based on
economic calculations or a concern for corporate "image," further increase the arbitrari-
ness and uncertainty of coppight law as a whole.
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ments of outrageousness or defamation are likely to be biased. We
could decide that arbitrariness, in the sense of random enforcement
that falls like lightning from the sky, is not constitutionally troubling
in a speech regulation. But then we have substantially revised the con-
cept of subjectivity, locating its harm in heuristic biases that subtly and
routinely lead most people to judge in ways that can be predicted
based on who is speaking and who is being attacked."
Defined in this way, the problem of systematic bias is still present
in copyright. Sympathetic plaintiffs are far more likely to have their
rights expansively defined than unattractive plaintiffs. Thus, lovable
Mickey Mouse gets lots of protection from a countercultural portrayal
when Disney sues a small comic book publisher over its scandalous
parody," while Howard Hughes has to lump it when a legitimate pub-
lisher publishes an unfavorable biography." Copyright losers are of-
ten artists making unconventional art that attempts to mock or sati-
rize society, or social critics using the expression
this
 powerful or
popular people for their own purposes. Although t i  group would
not qualify for special protection from non-speech related laws, free
speech's concern for protecting the oddball and the unpopular
speaker applies here. In any event, the uncertainty and arbitrariness.
of the idea/expression distinction make it a poor candidate to defend
copyright against a First Amendment challenge.
2. Fair Use
The 1976 Copyright Act codified previous judicial doctrine into a
statutory exception for fair use of copyrighted materials as a defense
to a finding of infringement. 74 The statute suggests four factors for
deciding fair use claims: the nature of the copyrighted work; the pur-
pose and character of the use, including whether it is commercial or
noncommercial; the amount and substantiality of the use in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use on the
market for the copyrighted work. Though the law allows courts to
consider other factors, in practice they usually rely on the enumerated
four. Fair use preserves ground for some use of and comment on
71 The Supreme Court has held that subjective employment practices can he suspect
when they appear to cover for systematic biases. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U.S. 977, 1000 (1087).
72 See Air Math% 581 F.2d at 758.
73 .5re Rosemont Enters, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d '303 (2d Cir. 1066).
74 See 17 U.S.C. .§ 107 (1904).
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copyrighted works, and courts and scholars generally agree that it
therefore protects First Amendment interests. 75
The "nature of the copyrighted work" factor allows courts to give
more protection to fanciful works than to factual ones, preserving
public access to facts and opinions about the world while fencing off
the content of romance novels and police dramas. 78 As a free speech
protector, this factor is particularly well-suited to a Meiklejohnian the-
ory of central political speech and peripheral entertaining speech.
The "nature" factor also allows courts to further First Amendment
interests in remaining silent by protecting unpublished works from
copying without good justification. 77
The "purpose and character of the use" factor enables courts to
give more weight to uses that serve some greater good than uses that
are simply made for the copier's convenience. Educational or news-
reporting uses receive more favor than pure entertainment. "Trans-
formative" uses such as parody also get more leeway. In addition,
courts also favor noncommercial uses under this factor, on the theory
that someone who is not making money from a use is less likely to be
a venal thief. 78 The "amount and substantiality" factor protects trivial
and incidental uses from liability. The "effect on the market" factor, in
some versions at least, protects uses that do not really hurt the copy-
right owner, so that speech is not restricted unless the restriction pre-
vents an identifiable harm. All this, copyright's defenders argue, sup-
ports First Amendment interests in the free flow of speech by limiting
the scope of copyright.
75 See, eg.. New Ent Publ'its Intl v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873 F.2i1 576, 584 (2d Cir.
1989); Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d (ir.
1982); Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 E Stipp. 957,
960 (D.N.14. 1978); Denicola, supra note 16, at 293-99; Perlman & Rhinelander, sepia note
1, at 394.
75 See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 405 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1900); if Blasi, supra note 57, at 553
(arguing that the First Amendment should vigorously protect fitcts, though "somehow we
have come to think of the passionate, often uninformed, soapbox orator as the classic
embodiment of our commitment to diversity").
77 See Harper Cy' Row, Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 558.
78 On the other hand, preferring noncommercial works arguably does Hide to pro-
mote First Amendment goals, because most widely disseminated works are done for profit
even when they also have a news reporting or public debate-enhancing purpose; the New
Thnk Thies does not come for free. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,
366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966). if we accept the basic idea that one can promote speech
by harnessing the profit motive to encourage speech production. then an excessive em-
phasis on the noncommerciality of a use, defined as the absence of profit-seeking, could
actually conflict : with the proper understanding of the relationship between copyright and
the First Amendment. See infra notes 226-237 and accompanying text.
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a. Vagueness
One significant problem with fair use is similar to the problem
with the idea/expression dichotomy: It is too vague to provide
enough guidance.79 Even those who believe that fair use serves First
Amendment purposes recognize its "infinite elasticity:" There are
four named factors, but the statute suggests that the list is not exclu-
sive, and there is little guidance for how to weigh one against another.
After decades of litigation, it is still difficult to tell when and whether
one can photocopy copyrighted materials, even for scientific re-
search.8 ' Inconsistencies are common in copyright cases, where fact-
specific analyses combined with the multifactor fair use test make
cases almost impossible to categorize. Because the outcome of any
particular case is uncertain, a potential infringer/fair user has to be
willing to bear the substantial costs of litigation for a chance to escape
liability. This seems quite likely to prompt self-censorship. 82
79 See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HAM'. L. Rev. 1661,
1692-94 (1988); Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright's Image, 22 U. DAY-
TON L. REv. 587, 612 (1997) [hereinafter, Litman, Reforming Information Law]; Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 NARY. L. REV. 1157, 1137
(1990); Lloyd L. %Velma), Fair Use, 4 FokuttAm L. REA. 1291 (1999); Wang, supra note 46,
at 1176-77.
80 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1106-07
(1990).
81 See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994); Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973); Duffy v. Penguin Books, 4 F.
Supp. 2d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Television Digest, Inc. v. United States Tel. Ass'n, 841 F.
Supp. S (D.D.C. 1993); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
82 See Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property
Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 Tr.xAs L. REV. 1853, 1867-68 (1991) hereinafter Coombe,
Objects of PropertyJ;LiIntan, Reforming Information Law, supra note 79, at 612-13.
My favorite piece of evidence that fair use is not carrying its speechprotective
weight comes from a 1997 pamphlet distributed by Kinko's. The guide informs the reader
that copyrighted materials may not be reproduced by anyone without permission from the
copyright owner. Fortunately, Kinko's provides a "Copyright/Trademark Permission Re-
quest Form." Assuming the customer can find the copyright owner, Kinko's will fax the
form to any United States location for free. The customer is to check all intended uses for
the copy, from a list of the following: "Personal," "News Reporting," "Scholarship/Re-
search," "Commercial," "Comment/Criticism," 'Teaching," and "Scan into Computer."
Copying Guidelines (1997) (pamphlet).
This form is a perfectly rational response to uncertainty. The permission form
identifies some lair use favorites, such as research and criticism, but only so that the copy-
right owner can decide whether or not to withhold permission. There is no indication that
"Comment/Criticism" might justify copying without permission. Now, maybe the govern-
ment cannot be held responsible for this distortion, though First Amendment libel law
thinks so; maybe the well-known fact that the average copy shop ignores what happens at
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b. Fair Use and Content Discrimination
Control of even one copyright can allow an owner to choke off
democratic dialogue, if that copyright is very important for full dis-
cussion of a particular issue of public interest. Courts thus sometimes
particularize the "purpose of the use" factor of the fair use test: Not
just any news reporting or scholarship evokes a public interest test,
but this report is important enough to justify stretching the bounda-
ries of fair use." The public interest test only increases the uncer-
tainty generated by fair use. Apparently, it is in the public interest to
find out more about Howard Hughes, 84 but not about Lenny Bruce 85
or Rudolph Valentino: 88 "who shot JFK" but not "who shot J.R." The
public interest test also requires suspect content judgments about the
quality or value of the allegedly infringing work. 87
Even without the public interest subfactor, one Might wonder
whether fair use is unconstitutional because it discriminates on the
basis of content. Fair use favors copying, even pure copying, for edu-
cational and news reporting purposes. The Supreme Court, evaluat-
ing an anticounterfeiting law that prohibited certain reproductions of
images of currency but made exceptions for newsworthiness or ecluca-
its self-service copiers blunts the force of the pamphlet's blanket assertions. But if fair use
is supposed to serve First Ameitchnent goals, there should be some i ndication that it actu-
ally does so in practice, not just in theory.
85 See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 307; Berlin v. E.C. Pubrns, 329 F.2d 541, 544
(2d Cir. 1964). Paul Goldstein has given particular attention to the risks of copyright mo-
nopoly. A large corporation may own a number of interlocking copyrights, and be able to
leverage them to exert undue market power. In such a case, he suggests, antimonopoly
principles are First Amendment principles. See Coldswin, supra note 2, at 987, 1043.
8'1 See Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 303.
85 See Marvin Worth Prods. V. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Stipp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
85 See Roltatier v. Killian] Shows, Inc., 379 F. Stipp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). As Celia Cold-
wag points mu, "It is not the merits of the court's iISSCSS11112111 of the relative values of
Hughes and Valentino but the subjective nature of its calculation that is disturbing." Gold-
wag, supra note 17, at 19.
87 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betantax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 CoLum, L. Rev. 1600, 1637 (1982). Even analysts
who disagree with Cordon's economic focus sometimes endorse a public interest test that
makes quality judgments about challenged works:
Most would agree that the Zapruder film adds more to the democratic dia-
logue than do the Sunday comics. Likewise, a more limited public interest in
cartoon characters or posters of cheerleaders warrants a more limited appli-
cation of the fair use doctrine, and thus greater hesitancy in limiting the
rights of the copyright holder on first amendment grounds.
Stephen S. Zimmerman, A Regulatory Theory of Copyright: Avoiding a First Amendment Conflict,
35 EMORY U. 163, 197 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
26	 &slim College Law Review	 [Vol. 42:1
tional value, found that these exceptions were impermissibly content-
based. 88
 There seems to be no reason that the exceptions would lose
their content-based nature when applied to copyright.
Fair use also favors criticism and parody. Reviewers get leeway, as
do users who humorously savage an original. These preferences are
justified on the perfectly reasonable grounds that copyright owners
have non-profit-based reasons to prevent uses that are critical of the
original work. 89
 In essence, fair use contains an analogue to the "right
of reply" statute struck down in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Toronto .° Tomato invalidated a statute that allowed people who had
been criticized in a newspaper a chance to respond on the same edi-
torial pages. Anyone who had not first been criticized would have to
pay to take out an ad or convince the editors to carry his or her view-
point. Like citizens covered by a right of reply statute, fair users have a
special privilege to copy a work so long as they are criticizing what
came before. They may use another's property—a copyrighted work—
without the owner's consent, just as a person criticized by the Miami
Herald could use its printing press and newsprint without the owner's
consent. If they do not disagree with the work, however, their use may
trigger an obligation to pay, just like any other consumer/speaker
Such protection for uses the copyright owner finds particularly
objectionable evokes the taint of compelled affirmation, having one's
property used to endorse a message with which one resolutely dis-
agrees.91
 It also seems to conflict with the Court's pronouncement in
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group that a speaker's
OWII speech cannot be appropriated by the state as a public accom-
modation.92 The Hurley Court held that the organizers of a St. Pat-
rick's Day parade could not be forced by state anti-discrimination law
to allow marchers to display signs affirming their nonheterosexual
Irishness because that would change the expressive message of the
811 See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984).
119 These reasons may also be profit-based, as criticism can destroy the market kw a
work even though it is not a substitute for that work. Courts refuse to consider negative
press a cognizable harm, just as business lost by a restaurant when a competing restaurant
opens tip down the block will not be legally cognizable harm.
90
 418 U.S. 241 (1974); cf. Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at 14 (striking down a regulation
that awarded access to utility-company mailing envelopes to critics of the utilities and criti-
cizing the regulation for awarding access only to those who disagree with appellant's views
and are hostile to appellant's interests").
91
 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at 11 (plurality); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705 (1977); W. Mt. State 11(1. of Ethic. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
92 See 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995).
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parade contrary to the organizers' intent. Hurley might be distin-
guished from fair use because there is only one parade, whereas the
existence of a parody does not change the meaning of the original
work. But, just as the Court recognized that signs announcing gay and
lesbian identities would reflect on the meaning of the rest of the pa-
rade,93 the existence of a parody may well lead consumers to reevalu-
ate the meaning of the original." Moreover, the point of copyright is
that it generally gives owners rights in copies, not just in physical
originals, so that a parody could fall within the scope of the author's
exclusive rights were it not for the content-based fair use exception.
The transformative (including critical or parodic) uses escape
court-backed prohibition because otherwise private owners would
prohibit expression they disliked. Against a background of generally
neutral copyright law, the government's hand appears to come be-
tween the speaker and the censor—but only if we accept that censor-
ship can be carried on by private parties with state backing. And this
vision of government's role in the speech market, I will show below, is
precisely what justifies copyright as a whole, not simply the transfor-
'native use preference in fair use law.
B. Less Restrictive Alternatives
In general, regulations that restrict speech as such are required
to meet fairly stringent tests. Even when a compelling government
interest supports the regulation, courts seek to assure that no more
speech is suppressed than necessary. 95
 The appropriate inquiry, there-
fore, is not whether having copyright is important enough to out-
weigh First Amendment concerns, but whether the particular regime
we have is a good way of protecting authors without unnecessarily in-
fringing First Amendment interests.
There is a standard free speech argument that applies here:
"more speech" and concerted action as a response to harmful
93 See id. ("[T]he communication produced by the private organizers would be shaped
by all those ... who wished to join in with some expressive demonstration of their own.").
"As Fred Schauer writes, he cannot look at Leonardo DaVinci's Mona Lisa ilte saute
way alter having seen the version with a mustache added, See Frederick Scimitar, The Ontol-
ogy of censniship, in CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION
147, 157 (Robert C. Post ed., 1998) hereinafter Schauer, Ontology].
95 See Police Dept v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 n.8 (1972); United Suites v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562-569 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940); Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939); De jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937).
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speech.96
 Instead of regulating hate speech, for example, the targeted
group should toughen up. Free speech "absolutists" argue that tar-
geted groups should overwhelm their opponents in the marketplace
of ideas by offering competing ideas, by educating the public that ra-
cism is bad 97 Groups can refuse to deal with people whose speech of-
fends them, and lobby others to do the same.
The argument for self-help exists in copyright, though it is not
yet recognized as a free speech argument. There are numerous self-
help mechanisms available for content providers who want to protect
original expression. For example, publishers could use contractual
mechanisms to prohibit copying and seek damages against anyone
who violated the contract." They could also attempt to enforce anti-
copying norms by structuring the industry to allow authorized pub-
lishers lead time or other advantages, and punishing defectors with
retributive "strike" editions." Content providers could deal only with
those who accepted their terms of service, which would include anti-
copying agreements. Digital watermarking and other copy-protection
technologies may allow content providers to defend their intellectual
property against quick copying just as a fence around a plot of land
hinders easy trespass)"
This kind of self-help is likely to be significantly more effective
than standard "more speech" self-help. Contracts are more persuasive
as an inducement to respect copying rights than the aspirational lan-
guage of equality is as a reason to respect other people. Of course, the
" See, e.g, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (holding that public
figures do not need the protection of expansive libel law because they have access to the
channels of communication to respond to attacks).
97 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring),
" See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on
Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 577 (1998); see also Henry H. Perritt,
Property and Innovation in the Global Information Infrastructure, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261,
283-85. Landes and Posner point out that the benefits of contractual anticopying provi-
sions will vary greatly depending on how widely the work needs to be distributed to guar-
antee a return to the publisher and whether the work will be resold or publicly performed.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 330. Thus, contractual provisions will not be particu-
larly useful to some kinds of content providers. But the variable strength of contractual
copying restrictions would, in a copyright-free world, shift content providers' production
to creative works that could be easily protected using contractual and other self-help
mechanisms; that the mix of works would change does not necessarily mean that creative
expression would disappear or even decrease on the whole.
" See Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 17, at 1401; cf. Catherine Green-
man, Tithing Sides in the Napster War, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 31, 2000, at El (discussing self-help
IlleaSlIre of putting distorted "cuckoo's egg" music files on free file-sharing services).
101 See generally Bell, supra note 98.
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private contract regime would still depend on the state as back-up,
and so might seem to raise similar First Amendment problems, but at
least no one would be able to control others' use of speech without
their prior consent to the seller's terms. Futhermore, general private
property and contract law, like that which protects printing presses,
computer servers, and other enabling mechanisms of speech, would
not be regulation specifically targeted at speech. 1 °1
As the cable industry does, content providers could also run pub-
lic education campaigns against the theft of intellectual property, en-
couraging people to buy only from authorized providers and educat-
ing the public about how to determine if a book is an original or a
knockoff. 1 °2 Noncontractual, self-help measures based purely, on per-
suasion are available.'" One example is shareware, software that is
provided for free by the creator. Users are asked to pay a fee if they
decide to continue to use the product after trying it out. Shareware
thrives today, even though only an estimated ten percent of users ac-
cede to this moral suasion. 10't It might decrease profits, but the First
Amendment arguably imposes certain costs on speakers, like the costs
of developing a persuasive counter-message to unpleasant speech.
Given that there are ways for private actors to protect original
content through voluntary transactions, the government arguably
does not have a compelling interest in restricting speech through
copyright. Yet a regime of self-help might be had for readers and
speakers in a variety of ways, as technical and contractual remedies
would not have the same leeway for de minimis uses as the copyright
101 Maybe, though, effectiveness is not the point. Maybe ineffective tounterspeech is
constitutionally relevant. but effective countermeasures are mainly technical or legal, not
speech themselves, and so they do not count. Yet contract and other forms of economic
self-help have strung expressive components: the obvious message of a refusal to deal (or
for that mailer, of a password-protectol system) is "do what I want or you may not have my
business." See Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Har-
ass-orient and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 Rut-Timis L. REV. 461, 524 11.288
(1995). Moreover, if effectiveness does not matter, then the possibility of connierspeech
was a red herring from the beginning, covering up a judgment that Certain speed] cannot
be suppressed no matter how harmful it is and how impossible it is to counter.
1" See Macrovision Corporation Continues Its Support of The Anti-Theft Cable Thsli Forre, Bus.
• WIRE, Feb. 13, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
103 Commentators have suggested many speech-based ways to make speech more entic-
ing to convince consumers to choose a particular source, such as delivering it Paster or
inore attractively, us order to maintain their market shares in the absence of copyright. See,
e.g., Breyer, supra note 4, at 281; Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits, .supra note 17, at 1901;
Perrin, supra note 98, at 283-85.
104 See Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Ctrl. LEGAL F. 217,
222.
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law, nor would they likely distinguish between fair and unfair use or
the use of a work's idea rather than its expression. 05 Contract and
technological countermeasures, therefore, might well impede the free
flow of information contrary to constitutional ideals. Note, however,
that the claim that copyright serves content users' speech interests
better than the self-help alternative appeals to First Amendment val-
ues as such, not to a non-speech compelling . government interest.
C. Speech as Property
One final way to solve the First Amendment problem is to
redefine the ground rules: to say that it is property, not speech, at is-
sue. 10° Copyright, the argument goes, recognizes the natural right of
the creator to control and profit from his creation. The author brings
the work into the world, creating it out of nothing, or out of the raw
materials of experience, and is thus entitled to dispose of that which
he has made, like Lear with his children.
If copyrightable speech is property, then copyright may no longer
need a free speech justification. Courts occasionally say that it would
be unfair to make a defendant pay for the material it used, because
that would hurt free speech interests.'" In standard First Amendment
contexts, however, it is unremarkable that a person may need to pay
105 SeeJulie E. Cohen, A Right To Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Manage-
ment" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L..RE.v. 981, 997-98, 1021-22 (1996); Litman, Reforming In-
formation Law supra note 79, at 601-02; Perritt, supra note 98, at 302. Bell argues that
automated use licensing will benefit users, because "fair use never conies for free." Bell,
supra note 98, at 580. Consumers incur search costs looking for information and opportu-
nity costs when they photocopy, clip, or . type quotes into their signature files. He argues
that automated rights management will reduce such transaction costs, thus giving the con-
sumer a net benefit despite the addition of a previously unnecessary payment to the copy-
right owner. See id. The conceptual flaw in Bell's reasoning is that if copyright owners
could not charge for lair uses, consumers' net benefit would be much larger; the fact that
they would retain some benefits if they had to pay does not prove that rights management
is a good deal for them. (Arguably,. litany copyright owners will not allow their content to
be made available electronically without rights management, but this is an empirical ques-
tion whose answer is unknown.) Moreover, anyone who uses Yahoo!, LEXIS, or a variety of
other electronic search engines is painfully aware that the new technology's effects on
search costs are uncertain at best. If the technology allows more charges by copyright own -
ers but. does not improve substantially for users, it will be a had bargain.
IN CI Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 905 (Stevens, J., concurring).
See Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Kniglu-Ritlder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Stipp. 875 (S.D.
Fla. 1978); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis, 293 F. Stipp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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to speak in a particular way—to take out an ad in the paper, to print
pamphlets, and so on. 1 °8
In this vision, fair use is not a necessary part of copyright; the
First Amendment has nothing to say about a requirement that a per-
son has to pay or get an owner's consent before she can express her-
self in a particular way. 109 The government is simply barred from pre-
venting willing sellers and buyers from making deals. 11° The First
Amendment and the Copyright Clause are in harmony because one
protects information against government suppression and the other
protects it against "private depredation." 111 Moreover, absolute prop-
erty rules, under which any interference with rights can he enjoined
and punished, are more appropriate than liability rules, Under which
a rights violator only has to pay for the value of what he took. 112
Such a theory comes at the price of a good deal of what generally
seems valuable about free speech. In fact, the state's refusal to inter-
vene in the distribution of material goods in aid of free speech may
only be palatable because speakers can choose fairly freely from the
universe of ideas and expression. Jack Balkin points out that; if the
government chose to close all public fora, leaving speakers to negoti-
ate in the private market for space in which to speak, many people
would sense a First Amendment difficulty. 113
los Cf. Loyd Corp. v. 'Fanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (holding that a landowner may
exclude 1111Wallted speakers from his land).
1 °9 See Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL. STUD. 67, 73 (1992) (ar-
guing that. the fair use defense should never be available for satiric. uses because as we do
not suppose that writers should be allowed to steal paper and pencils in order to reduce
the cost of satire, neither is there a compelling reason to subsidize social criticism by allow-
ing writers to use copyrighted materials•without compensating the copyright holder").
110 SeeJolm 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment,
63 U. Cm. L. REV. 49, 84-85 (19911).
In See id, at 79,
112 See Hardy, supra note 104, at 217. I disagree with Hardy on many points. not least of
which is his decision to remove several factors that favor latitude for copiers, such as the
non-profit-based incentives that people have to produce speech, from his calculus of
rights. See id. at 221. Hardy discounts the extent to which authors use others' works to spur
their own creativity, assuming instead that a person who wishes to restrict access to his work
to paying parties is making a choke that only affects his own incentives and ability to cre-
ate. Hardy also gives the game away by restricting his analysis to situations in which copying
is not :tmenable to a fair use analysis. See id. at 241. Deciding whether or not fair use ap
plies often imposes a large transaction cost on its own; the difficulty of determining fair
use in advance would justify a liability rule, particularly when a copier acted in good faith
:Hid mistook the limits of fair use.
115 See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: •Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 Duxv.1.4 375, 400.
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The property rights argument depends on certain unsound as-
sumptions about the appropriate subjects and scope of ownership. 114
It takes as a foundation the idea that government is supposed to pro-
tect my property, and that such protection does not count as "inter-
vention" into the market or the private sphere. 115 But this finesses the
question of how information is converted into property. Why is some-
thing less "my own" if I did not think it up, so long as I said it, or
made my own copy? 116 Implicit in the argument is a modified "sweat
of the brow" theory—information is mine if I worked to create it, and
did not copy too much in the process.
The sweat of the brow theory is highly troublesome as a
justification for anything like our current copyright regime. Not only
has the Supreme Court rather resoundingly rejected UP sweat of the
brow does not explain why facts and ideas are not copyrightable. In
Uhist as a legal realist might argue that economic liberty is more than the
right to sign contracts of adhesion, we understand that expressive liberty is
not simply the right to make noises in the air directed to no one in particu-
lar.... Effective communication, or rather its substantive possibility, is an un-
avoidable component of the liberty of speech, just as effective bargaining, or
its substantive possibility, is an essential component of economic liberty.
M. at 401.
"4
 The economic modeling of the market for information faces a troubling concep-
tual problem: The perfectly functioning tnarket assumes perfect information. But when
information is itself a marketable commodity, how can there be freely circulating full in-
formation in the perfect market? Information does not fit well in the market model be-
cause it is a condition of the market's existence. See James Boyle, A Many of Law and Infor-
mation: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAI.. L. REV. 1413, 1420, 1443-
48 (1992). As a result, a purely property-based vision of infOrmation will mistlescribe the
way information exchange actually works.
115 , t,e McGinnis, supra note 110, at 8511.149, 123.
116
 Wendy Gordon has recently offered a property theory that tries to avoid these prob-
lems by incorporating restraints on what authors may appropriate, using the Lockean pro-
viso that an appropriator must leave "as much and as good" for later takers. See Wendy J.
Gordon, A Properly Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) [hereinafter Gordon, A Property Right in Self
E.vpressioni, She believes that this approach accommodates free speech concerns without
requiring explicit application of the First Amendment. See id. at 1539. The restraints she
would impose look a lot like the idea/expression distinction and the fair use defense,
though, and thus her property theory, while it avoids may criticisms of standard property
theories, does not in my opinion adequately answer First Amendment questions about
copyright.
117 See Feist Pttbi'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). The Court has
generally maintained that copyright is a creature of statute, not natural right. See Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) ("The protection given to
copyrights is wholly statutory."); id. at 420-3011.10 ("Copyright is not based upon any natu-
ral right the audmr has.").
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theory, my idea is no less my own than my expression. Both are em-
bodied in a creative work, and my idea may be far more valuable. One
answer is that tracing the source of ideas (and facts) can be too
difficult, and it is cost-unjustified for the law to allow suits for anything
but copying expression. 118 Even if this did not sound like a just-so
story, we do have a relevant example of an intellectual property re-
gime that does not capitulate to tracing difficulties: patent law. The
first inventor of an idea or discoverer of a fact could be protected in
similar fashion.
The property vision also cannot explain the peculiar rights that
copyright allows authors, such as the right to control derivative works,
even if those works would otherwise be independently copyrightable;
the right to control public performances; and translation and
abridgement rights." 9 In all these cases, other people may do as much
or more work to bring new expression into the world, but their work
does not count. Their children are illegitimate. Moreover, the prop-
erty rights theory makes the limited duration of copyright particularly
hard to explain. Houses (and paper and ink) do not revert to a com-
mon pool after an owner has had control of them for a certain period
of time. "If I may own Blackacre in perpetuity, why not also Black
Beauty?" 12° The standard defense of limited duration from this per-
spective is that, eventually, tracing the copyright proprietor will be-
come impossible. But surely this is only because the duration of copy-
right is limited: If it were unlimited, the market would generate
institutions that could find owners, just as it is possible to find out who
owns any particular piece of land. Plenty of permissions organizations
already exist, such as ASCAP, BMI, and the Copyright Clearance Cen-
ter. There is no reason from a property perspective that anything once
in their catalogs has to be set free. 121
But a property rights enthusiast could agree with all these criti-
cisms, and argue that these limits should be abolished. Greater consis-
tency would cause greater First Amendment concerns, though, and
would still not answer tough questions about the scope of owner-
118 See McGinnis, supra note 110, at 83.
"9 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973) ("filbert: is no fixed, immuta-
ble line to tell its which 'human produciions' arc private properly and which are so gen-
eral as to become 'free as the air.'"); Stephen M. Mcjohn, Fair Use and Privatization in Copy-
right, 35 SAN DIEco L. 61. 80-84 (1998) (arguing !hat any copyrighted work contains
noncopyrightable elements that a property rights approach is ill-equipped to identify).
120.5tw Nimmer, Copyright, supra note 16, at 1193.
121 See Mcjohn, supra note 119, at 77-78.
34 .
	Boston College LOW Berlin°
	
[Vol. 42:1
ship.122 Even if transaction costs are generally low in cyberspace, it will
remain just as difficult to distinguish idea from expression or deter-
mine substantial similarity in bytes as it is on the printed page.i 23
In addition, as Eugene Voloklr and Brett McDonnell point out,
any interest can be reconceptualized as a property interest to defeat a
speech claim, 124 Your right to swing your fist ends at my face, but the
law can define how far my "face" extends. There is no particular rea-
son the law could not give me a property interest in physical and men-
tal integrity that could be violated by exposure to pornography; no
reason, that is, but the First Amendment as it is now understood.
D. Conclusion
This part examined standard justifications for copyright against
free speech challenges. The usual suspects—the idea/expression dis-
tinction and fair use—attempt to provide a justification that does not
depend on copyright's speech-enhancing role. Unfortunately, neither
idea/expression nor fair use bear the necessary weight, primarily be-
cause they are too vague to provide a speech user with any real cer-
tainty about what she may say. 125 There are also less restrictive alterna-
tives to copyright as we know it that would not require nearly as much
overt state intervention further weakening the conventional case for
copyright. And, the proposal to assimilate speech law in its entirety to
property law is ultimately incapable of avoiding the difficult questions
122 See David Fewer, Constilutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression and the Limits of
Copyright in Canada, 55 U. TORONTO FAG. L. REV. 175, 187-88 (1997) (noting that natural
property rights concepts of copyright gloss over the dependence of authors on others'
expression).
123 cf. Hardy, supra note 104, at 219 (arguing that low transaction costs justify choosing
property rules over liability rules for copyright).
124 See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 57, at 2445-46; see also Eugene Volokh & Mark
Lemley, Freedom. of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147
(1998) (noting that a bill introduced in Congress would have declared the United States
flag to be copyrighted and defined flag-burning and desecration as infringement).
125 As several commentators have noted, the existence of two apparently quite differ-
ent justifications for 5 mling copyright protection consistent with the First Amendment has
also caused practical difficulties. The contraction of each doctrine is justified by reassuring
free speech partisans that the other doctrine is still available, so First Amendment con-
cerns do not receive serious consideration. See Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information
Policy, LAW & ComrEmr. PROBS. 185, 204-06 (1992) [hereinafter, Litman, Copyright and
Information Policy]; Netanel, supra note 63, at 303. One answer to this problem might be to
make a First Amendment analysis an explicit part of copyright decisions, rather than claim-
ing that fair use and idea/expression are themselves sufficient. See NIMMER, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH, supra note 15, § 2.05[C], at 2-73; Denicola, supra note 16, at 304-06; Litman,
Copyright and Information Polity, supra, at 208; Wang, supra note 46, at 1159, 1177.
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of how far to extend ownership of intellectual creation. 126 And yet it
seems inconceivable that copyright could he unconstitutional, since it
serves such an important public interest. Nor has my aim been to
suggest that copyright is unconstitutional. Rather, its constitutionality
depends on the fact that the government interest underlying copy-
right is the promotion of speech..
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT FOR COPYRIGHT
A. How Copyright Serves First Amendment Values
When the conflict between free speech and copyright was first
theorized, the natural response was that the expressive and communi-
cative interests involved in copyright protection were constitutionally
cognizable. Therefore, every recent discussion of copyright and free
126 One might also argue that applying First Amendment principles is u nnecessary
copyright because the Framers took free speech into account when they wrote the Consti-
tution. As a waiter of constitutional history, this claim is debatable at best. Copyright was
first developed as a tool of official censorship. See MARK Rosa, AuntoRs AND OWNERS 12,
15 (1993); Patterson, supra note 14. at 3. The presence of the Copyright Clause was one
factor in the inclusion of the First Amendment in the Hill of Rights, because and-
Federalists feared that copyright could be used to reward favored authors and punish dis-
favored ones. See Fraser, supra note 17, at 19-20 &RAN. Furthermore, the claim that the
Constitution already balanced free speech interests against copyright does not appear to
distinguish the Copyright. Clause from any other part of the Constitution, such as the
Commerce Clause. See N1MMER, FREEDOM or SPEECH, supra note 15, §2.05[C1 at. 2-57.
The existence of the Copyright Clause certainly does not imply that the Copy-
right Act as it exists now comports with the First Amendment as it exists now. Modern
speech theory itself is rather young, constitutionally speaking. See, e.g, Schenk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United Stales, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). Before the First
Amendment was applied against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Git low
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), very few people thought to challenge long-accepted
practices such as bans on blasphemy. obscenity, libel, and politically subversive speech. On
its side, copyright has expanded substantially in recent years. The demise of the registra-
tion requirement has made copyright easier to obtain and harder for a potential user to
determine. The copyright term has doubled and redoubled. The media covered by copy-
right law have expanded to include new forms and some older ones, such as newspapers,
that were previously considered too ephemeral to warrant copyright protection. PerfOrm-
ance, translation, and derivative rights have been added to the original replication rights,
giving to the copyright owner the sole right to authorize adaptations and reworkings that
were once up for grabs. See, e.g., Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Gas. 201 (C.C.E.I). Pa. 1853); Fol-
som v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). As both kinds of information policy ex-
paint their scope, it is not surprising that they would collide.
Another important point about the 'claim that the Copyright Clause itself does
the free speech balancing job is that it finesses a crucial question of institutional compe-
tence. The claim is not really that the Clause balances free speech concerns with other
goals, but that Congress does in the copyright law it enacts. 1 take up the issue of congres-
sional balancing in Part Ill. See infra notes 217-251 and accompanying text.
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speech calls attention to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Harper &' Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises: "The Framers in-
tended copyright itself to be an engine of free expression. By estab-
lishing a marketable right to use one's. expression, copyright supplies
the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas:127 While the
Court was at the time mainly concerned with copyright's furtherance
of the First Amendment privilege not to speak, 128 its language has
generally been taken to have wider import, covering copyright's
speech-productive incentives as well. 129
 In a leading treatise on free-
dom of speech, Professor Nimmer takes the same position. He con-
clucks that, though expression ordinarily deserves protection from
government suppression, the idea/expression dichotomy is justified
by the counter-speech value of encouraging authorship. 130
 That is, a
speech-promoting regulation can justifiably suppress more speech
than a regulation with a permissible but non-speech-promoting
aini. 131
When government enforces copyright, it encourages a broad,
diverse array of publicly available ideas and expressions, a core inter-
est underlying the First Amendment. 132
 Free speech values, then, sup-
port affirmative government action to encourage speech by harness-
ing the power of the market. The marketplace is not just a forum
where ideas compete for dominance, but a literal (if not always liter-
127
 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). The contention that the Framers held this belief is
probably wrong, given copyright's historical connection to censorship. See Fraser, supra
note 17, at 19-20.
128
 See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 559.
to See, e.g., Netanel. supra note 63, at 289.
' 30 See NINIMER, FREEDOM or SPEECH, supra note 15, §2.05ICJ, at 2-66 n.184; see also
Goklstein, supra note 2, at 990.
tai Cf. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 120 S. Ct. 1346, 1357-58 (2000)
(Stutter, j., concurring) (students' First Amendment objection to activity fee was less per-
suasive because the purpose of the fee was to increase speech); Buckley r. Valeta, 424 U.S.
1, 92-93 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding publicly financed campaign subsidies because
they facilitated First Amendment self-government goals).
152
 The Association of American Publishers expressed the point with understandable
firmness:
Freedom of expression is meaningless unless works are created and distrib-
uted.... ['The copyright law assures that there is opportunity for recoup-
ment of the intellectual and financial investment of atithors and publishers,
that their creative efforts are maintained, and that their works are made avail-
able to the public. It is essential to the purpose of the First Amendment.
Brief of Annals Curiae Association of American Publishers, Inc., supra note 1 (footnote
omitted); see also Goldwag, supra note 17, at 23; Shipley, supra note 17, at 986-87; Wang,
supra note 46, at 1177.
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ary) marketplace where ideas get traded for money. What the "engine
of free expression" argument means, simply enough, is that there are
First Amendment interests on both sides of a copyright case. The
plaintiff complaining about copying upholds the public interest inso-
far as a prohibition on copying preserves creators' incentives to put
creative material in the marketplace, just as the defendant' upholds
the public interest insofar as copying is necessary to enable broad ac-
cess to information.
The full argument that there are First Amendment interests on
both sides presupposes that the extent to which a speaker is heard is a
constitutionally relevant fact.'" Being heard is crucial to a speaker.
The government cannot require speakers to speak in the middle of
the night on an island off the mainland even if it provides speakers
free transportation there. Speech values are harmed when govern-
ment acts in ways that substantially impair speakers' ability to com-
municate. Thus, copyright aids free speech because le] ffective dis-
semination of creative work costs money. "134
Free speech theory sometimes seems to imagine a nation of
speakers each yammering into a void. Copyright, by contrast, empha-
sizes the communal nature of creativity and speech. People only share
their ideas because there is an audience, and copyright is limited be-
cause speakers depend on what was said before. Correspondingly, lis-
teners are entitled to speech rights because they may choose to adopt
the messages that others are sending and also because their varying
interpretations may enrich our shared dialogue as much or more than
the original message. The speech-interests-on-both-sides argument
asserts that preserving a market share for speakers is constitutionally
relevant because speakers often need an incentive to speak. If the
government refuses to enforce copyright, the market for ideas will
end up impoverished.
B. Implications for General Free Speech Doctrine
Copyright is not a constitutional anomaly. There are a series of
areas in which First Amendment interests may be served by restricting
and channeling speech. The reasons for government regulation are
different, but they are analogous. To have a healthy, dynamic system
of speech, there 'must be certain architectural limits on the system
13]
	
Hurley V. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 508
(1995) (noting that a parade's expressive content is meaningless if no one sees it).
11" Wang, supra note 40. at 1178.
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that shape what occurs therein."5 Many people agree with this claim
as applied to property rights, but not to speech; intellectual property,
which bridges the gap between the two, shows that speech cannot es-
cape government structuring, because speech is often capable of sup-
pressing other speech.
One major purpose of my comparison of copyright and other
market failure or speech-versus-speech theories is to suggest that First
Amendment absolutists, who have busied themselves fending off radi-
cal attacks in areas such as campaign finance, sexual harassment, por-
nography, and hate speech, should be attending to the apparently
enormous exception to standard First Amendment doctrine embod-
ied in copyright. Copyright, after all, covers every single fixed piece of
expression,'56 not just isolated areas of the universe of free speech.
But it is not unconstitutional, because its absence would be worse for
speech. Broad indictments of regulations designed to promote some
speech by controlling other kinds threaten to make copyright look
unconstitutional; this is a reason to reject those broad theories, or at
least to cabin them.
This section elaborates on the incentive argument for copyright,
explaining how it is properly described as a market failure theory that
enlists government to achieve a better balance of speech, and how
copyright's incentive structure has predictable effects on content. In
many cases of speech-versus-speech conflict, the market failure
identified can only be addressed by some form of regulation that can
be described as content-based. The question is not whether one has to
accept all such regulations if one accepts any, because there are rea-
sonable distinctions between the various kinds of market failures. In-
stead, my aim is to show that a basic problem of speech-versus-speech
underlies several important kinds of regulations and proposed regula-
tions, and that the case against them must not rely on the simple claim
that the government has to be kept out of the world of speech.
I want to be clear that I remain uncertain about the wisdom of
these various regulations. My understanding, however, is that many
people support copyright and oppose one or more of the other
speech regulations discussed in this section, usually without consider-
ing the relationship between those two positions, and I am interested
in whether that is a consistent stance. My sense is that one's conclu-
135 See, e.g., Cass &lumen', A New Deal for Speech, 17 1 -1AsTuvos 14. 137 (1994).
136 And a few unfixed; for example, one can infringe by publicly performing a copy-
righted work even if the performatwe is not fixed.
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sion about whether copyright is fundamentally distinguishable from
other regulations depends mainly on one's beliefs about the extent to
which the First Amendment' should invalidate laws that dispropor-
tionately burden the speech of disadvantaged groups that are not
primarily defined by the content of their speech. The First Amend-
ment, conventionally understood, regulates the conditions under
which the law may disfavor people based on their beliefs and their
speech (Communists, pornographers, copiers). But, at times, the dis-
favored categories precede the speech, and speech regulations only
have a disparate impact on people in those categories rather than
creating the categories. It is possible that the First Amendment is pri-
marily concerned with laws that create a category of disfavored speak-
ers, not laws that may enhance prior disadvantages by regulating
speech. Yet that First Amendment scents impoverished and unrealistic
to me. 137
I. The Basic Analogy Between Copyright and Other Market-Failure-
Based Speech Regulations
The argument for government intervention is not unique to
copyright. It is made by a number of prominent scholars discussing
pornography, sexual harassment, hate speech, campaign finance, and
new media. 138 For example, racist speech is said systematically to un-
157 For example, African Americans and Jews who were drawn to Communism were, in
part, responding to discrimination, while the racial and ethnic composition of the Ameri-
can Communist Party added extra impetus to the movement for its suppression; disfavored
groups can define themselves, and be defined, through regulated speech. See JAMES
GOODMAN, STORIES OF Scorrsnotto 27-29, 74-84, 204 (1994) (African Americans); David
Suchoff, The Rosenberg Case and the New York Intellectuals, in SECRF:r AGENTS: THE ROSEN-
BERG CASE, MCCARTHYISM, ANI) FIFTIES AMERICA (Marjorie Camber & Rebecca L. Walko-
witz eds., 1995) 153, 158-59, 161 (Jews). Moreover, I see no strong reason why the First
Amendment should limit its protection to cases in which the suppression of a definable
group's speech is intentional.
138 See generally OWEN Ftss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY
USES OF STATE POWER (1996); FREEING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 195-223 (David S. Allen & Robert Jensen eds., 1995); CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); MART J. MXFSUDA ET AL., WORDS TuAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 77-78 (1993);
THE PRICE WE PAS': THE CASE AGAINST' RACIST SPEECH (Laura J. Lederer & Richard Del-
gado eds., 1995); CA5S SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY ANI) THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECII (1993);
Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the 1Thrleplace and the Problem of Discriminatory
Harassment, 75 TEx. L. REV. 687, 694-95, 735 (1997); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Struclare, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 11ARr. L. REV. 781
(1987); Sangree, supra note 101, at 559-60 (arguing that sexual harassment law furthers
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dermine and devalue the speech of minority groups, because racist
speech silences minorities and makes their speech seem less credible
when it does appear. 159
 Unlimited campaign spending arguably dis-
torts democratic dialogue by allowing wealthy donors and interest
groups to set the public agenda, while political deliberation gets lost
in the scramble for cash. Cable providers may exclude broadcasters
from their former audiences by refusing to carry them as part of a
cable package.
The analogy can be seen by describing copyright's incentive
mechanisms in greater detail. Copying makes original authors less
attractive to publishers because there is not much point in paying for
what others will then take for free. Audiences will pay less attention to
the original speaker if her work can be freely reproduced by others,
perhaps even without attribution. 140 Ultimately, copying makes
authors less willing to enter into the market in the first place. The ar-
gument for copyright explains how piratical speech can have negative
effects on authors and audiences' access to speech, just as the radical
case for speech regulation explains how hate speech can distort the
speech incentives of minority-group members and the receptivity of
potential audiences or how political donations can crowd certain
views out of the pUblic domain. Therefore, copyright and the radical
theories have a family resemblance in that they identify certain
mechanisms that operate through speech and that negatively affect
the functioning of the marketplace for speech.
The similarity in the arguments for regulation is apparent, for
example ;
 in Catharine MacKinnon's argument for a civil rights rem-
edy for pornography. Not only does MacKinnon argue that porno-
graphic speech silences women's speech, her analysis converges with
that of infringement doctrine. Both in evaluation of substantial simi-
larity and in application of the fair use defense, copyright refuses to
look at an accused work as a whole. This is because the critical issue is
the harm the defendant may have done to the plaintiff by using a
copyrighted work, no matter what else the defendant may have cre-
free speech values); Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U.
Cow. L. REV. 935 (1993).
139 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE Lj. 431, 458-61; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Con-
sidering the Victim's Story, 87 Micti. L. REv. 2320, 2323-26 (1989).
110 Cf. David L. Marcus, Faux Von 'rept Mk Sheds Light on Power of Wet, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 13, 1997, at 1)1 (discussing problems that occur when a creative work is widely
misanributed).
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ated in the course of so doing. MacKinnon likewise rejects the "work
as a whole" standard of obscenity law: "[T]aking the work 'as a whole'
ignores [the fact that] legitimate settings diminish the injury per-
ceived to be done to those whose trivialization and objectification it
contextualizes. , If a woman is subjected, why should it matter that
the work has other value? "141 This agreement on what is essentially a
detail of the respective regulatory schemes shows how both kinds of
market-failure theories attend to what a regulable work does in the
world and not to what it says in itself. 142
The incentive-based or speech-on-both-sides argument also ap-
pears where relatively new media are at issue and, lacking a tradition,
their structure and function are contestable. 143 Government has to do
something about new media, and the Supreme Court has recognized
that government action will inevitably balance speech against speech
in such cases. The Court has accepted the theory that the Federal
Communications Commission was established because an unregu-
lated radio spectrum led to chaos. So many people were trying to talk
that they cancelled each other out. 144 While other forms of regulation,
including a property regime based on first-in-time capture of spec-
trum, would also have worked, possibly better, some form of govern-
ment-backed rights holding was necessary to enable broadcast
speech. 143 Although broadcasters were private entities, their actions
threatened to "snuff out the free speech of others." The Court ulti-
mately found that there was no right to do so, and that there was a
Catlmritie A. Mackinnott, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HA RV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1,21 (1985); see also CATHAR/NE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST TI !RORY OFTIIF,
STATE 202 (1989).
142 Self-help arguments also align against copyright and hate speech/pornography
regulation. See supra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
lo See Pen man & Rhinelander, supra note I, at 408 (To the extent that the copyright
is perceived as an economic device to advance the public interest in dissemination of intel-
lectual products it is comparable to a broadcast license. Both are monopolies granted by
the government to facilitate the distribution of information. Both bear the sante public
interest burden."); see also Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
"1 See Red Lion, 395 U.S al 376 ("Without government control, the medium would be
of little use because of the cacaphony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly
and predictably heard.").
HI' See Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical &unity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97 Co-
tom. L. RE v. 905 (1997) !hereinafter Hazlett, Physical Scarcity]; Thomas W, Hazlett, The
Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J. L. & ECON. 133 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Hazlett, Rationality].
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strong government interest in preventing such silencing. 146 In addi-
tion, the Court has found that there is a First Amendment interest in
encouraging the dissemination of a diversity of views via broadcast
media. 147
More recently, the Supreme Court upheld must-carry rules re-
quiring cable providers to carry local broadcast stations in order to
preserve the profitability of broadcast so that free local television will
remain widely available.I 48
 Cable providers are required to subsidize
broadcast television for the greater public good, just as fair use argua-
bly requires some authors to subsidize others for the greater good. 149
The Court found the costs of must-carry rules to cable providers
could he justified in large part because of concerns that cable could
4'6 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387. In Associated Press ix United States, the Supreme Court up-
held antitrust controls on newspapers on similar grounds: "Freedom of the press from
governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of
that freedom by private interests." 326 U.S. I, 20 (1945) (footnote omitted). Because the
First Amendment is based on the belief that a diversity of available views is essential to a
free society, its "command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of
ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints
upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom." Id.
"7 See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm., 436 U.S. 775(1978); see also Time Warner Entin't
Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that public access to a diversity of
views and sources of opinion is an interest "at the core of the First Amendment").
I i9
 See Turner!, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
' 49
 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Glickman v. ;Menton Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,
521 U.S. 457 (1997), sheds some light on the question of when a group can be taxed to
support others' speech. Glickman upheld industry-specific taxes to support generic adver-
tising for that industry's products. Although people often have a right not to be compelled
to pay fO• others' speech, the Court held that the government could assess fees for product
advertising. SeeAbood v. Detroit Bd. of [due., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The Court reached this
conclusion because, first, no producer had to change or restrain its own advertising, even
though the regulation decreased the money available to pay for such ads. Copyright limits,
too, never restrain authors, even if some authors make less money because of them. Sec-
ond, the regulations did not compel speech from anyone; no producer was required to
associate itself with the generic ads. A copyright owner is not compelled to repeat or en-
dorse a fair use out of his or her own mouth. Cf. Putney:1rd Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 445
U.S. 74, 88 (1080). Third, there was no compulsion to endorse or finance any political or
ideological views. In copyright, fair users might well advocate for some ideological view-
point, but the government would not have chosen any such message, and in that sense the
burden is less than that imposed by a government decision to make a plum producer pay
for ads that say that all plums are tasty. Inasmuch as fair use is decentralized, it is not as
worrisome as taxes on magazines or paper. And, like a progressive income tax, it may
weigh most heavily on the "richest" works. Glickman's underlying point was that compul-
sory taxes for advertising were justified, even though sonic people objected, because the
contributions increased the welfare of the producers as a whole, just as limits on copyright
increase the welfare of authors as a whole by allowing them to draw on sources of inspira-
tion and information.
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take anticompetitive action against broadcast competitors, squeezing
broadcasters out of the market.
That anticompetitive possibility, however, relies on the behavior
of the television audience. Even if cable did not carry broadcast
channels, television households could get the benefit of both if they
used manual switches. But the average viewer is unwilling to use a
switch. Because the television audience is composed of technologi-
cally inept couch potatoes, cable providers could exclude broadcast-
ers froM cable households. The Court characterized this interaction
between cable providers and the market they face as a matter of pro-
viders' power: "A cable operator, unlike speakers in other media, can
thus silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the
switch. The potential for abuse of this private power over a central
avenue of communication cannot be overlooked. " 15i0 Crucially, the
power to silence depends not on any technological facts but on behav-
ioral facts; not on characteristics of the speaker but of the audience. 151
Insofar as they look to the appropriate conditions for the maximiza-
tion of speech given the way that people actually behave, the must-
carry rules have the same justifications as copyright, campaign
finance reform, and regulation of hate speech and pornography.
Others have noted that copyright is relevant to more politicized
free speech issues. Eugene Volokh and like-minded scholars, who
think that the radical theories are a very bad idea, have also become
nervous about copyright. 152 Meanwhile, some of the radical theorists
are arguing that courts' unhesitating acceptance of copyright, a
speech restriction that serves the interests of the wealthy and power-
150 Turner/. 512 U.S. at 656.
PA See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on En-
closure of the. Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 354, 374 (1999) (noting that harriers to mul-
tiple cable operators competing fOr each viewer are not really physical or technological but
economic).
152 See generally Volokh & Lemley, supra note 124; Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 57.
See also Expert Report of Professor Lawrence Lessig, A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
114 F. Stipp. 2c1. 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (Nos. 99-5183, 00-0074), available at littp://c11.nap-
ster.com/lessig.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2000) (discussing intersection between free speech
and copyright in the Napster Music file-sharing litigation); Brief of' Amid Curiae Associa-
tion of' Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. at al., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 18688 (July 28, 2000) (Nos. 00-16401, 00-16403), available at Imp://
dl.napster.com/amicus_physicians.pdf  (last visited Oct. 31. 2000) (anti-abortion group
opposing injunction against copyright infringement on the grounds that such injunctions
could be used against other kinds of speech); Brief of American Civil Liberties Union et
al., A & M. Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 U.S. App. 1..EX1S 18688 (July 28, 2000) (Nuts.
00-16401, 00-16403), available at http://www.achinc.org/cyher/ napster-brief.html (Iasi
visited Oct. 31. 2000) (opposing copyright injunction on flee speech grounds).
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ful, is unprincipled and hypocritical when the radical theories of
regulation are brushed aside as incompatible with free speech. 153
What the people on both sides of the issue—particularly the radical
theorists—have not yet discussed, however, is that copyright is not just
a run-of-the-mill speech restriction. It is a member of a family of
speech restrictions unified by the claim that some government regula-
tions improve the functioning of the market for speech by acting as
the equivalent of a police force keeping order. 154 Copyright is the per-
fect demonstration of Stanley Ingber's point that marketplace theo-
ries readily lend themselves to arguments for government interven-
tion. Once we decide that a market is valuable because it furthers
individual choice, it becomes possible to argue that individuals should
be regulated in aspects of their market behavior to increase the ag-
gregate amount of choice.'
The fact that incentives to speak have constitutional weight and
deserve First Amendment consideration is important. If we accept the
speech-enhancing justification for copyright, we cannot easily dismiss
other market-failure claims. If copyright serves the First Amendment,
we cannot say, as the Supreme Court has, that "the concept that gov-
ernment may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
. First Amendment. " 156
a. The Importance of Incentives for Future Speech
One response to my claim of structural similarity between copy-
right and other market-failure theories is that copyright is not about
153 See, e.g, Richard Delgado 8.: jean Stefancic, Ten Arguments Against Hate-Speech Regula-
tion: How ValidF, 23 N. Kv. L. Rev. 475, 484 (1996); Richard Delgado & David H. Mm, Pres-
sure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regula-
tion, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871, 892 (1994); Martin E. Lee, The Price We Pay: The Case Against
Racist Speech, Hale Propaganda and Pornography, NAT'L CATu. REP., Oct. 4, 1996, at 17 (book
review).
154
 The incentive-based argument is not limited to left-leaning academics even outside
the copyright field. For example. Justice White, dissenting in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974), argued t hat private individuals should not face high barriers to libel suits:
It is not at all inconceivable that virtually unrestrained defamatory remarks about private
citizens will discourage them from speaking out and concerning themselves with social
problems." Id. at 400 (White,j., dissenting). See also Richard A. Epstein, Publication, and the
First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1033
(2000) (arguing that enjoining def'amatory broadcasts would ultimately strengthen the
press's information-gathering ability by increasing its credibility).
155 See higher, supra note 23, at 4-5.
15° Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1. 48-49 (1976).
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restricting A's speech to enhance the relative voice of B, even if it is
about restricting A's speech to B's advantage. Because this characteri-
zation does not note that the advantage that copyright confers on B is
based on the attractiveness of B's speech—people who want it will
have to pay—this reformulation makes copyright sound even worse
from a free speech perspective, like an aggressive libel law or restric-
tions on seditious speech or bans on comparative price advertising for
alcohol, all of which benefit one group at another's expense. More
importantly, the "advantage and not speech" characterization does
not describe the reasoning that courts and theorists actually use to
defend copyright, and it is this reasoning that is structurally similar to
other, less favored arguments. Copyright is justified because of its sys-
tematic effects on future speakers—the profits that copyright makes
possible will spur many people to invest in creating speech.
Once we concede that harm to market-based incentives to speak
in the future is harm to First Amendment-protected interests, how-
ever, it makes little sense to limit the cognizable class of speech-
suppressing private acts to that which merely copies and sucks off
profits. It is not the profit-making or even the profit-stealing nature of
the infringement that is constitutionally relevant. It is the decrease in
the speaker's incentive to speak, which could also be caused by speech
that derided her or by speech so pervasive that her message was lost,
that triggers First Amendment interests on her side. 157 Put another
way, it is descriptively false to say that First Amendment law is not con-
cerned with silencing (defined as private parties' acts that decrease
other private parties' incentives to speak) or crowding out (defined as
private parties' speech that makes other private parties' speech less
likely to be attended to).
We regulate when we think that incentives to speak deserve pro-
tection. Thus, we regulate copiers, but not people who tell other peo-
157 Frank Michel ►an points out that "silencing" is usually as figurative as it is literal:
American constitutional law has long indulged in even more extended
figurations of silencing, reaching hack at least to the moment when it was re-
solved that punishment of speech already uttered, as well as prior restraint of
yet-unuttered speech, can count as an abridgment of the freedom of speech
and a cognate deprivation of liberty forbidden by the Pint and fourteenth
amendments. The silencing wrought by criminalization of speech acts is less
direct, more metaphorical, and no more reliably efficacions than that
wrought (on Professor MacKinnon's account) by pornography.
Frank I. Michelmun, Conceptions of Denumrars in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of
Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 29611.13 (1989) (citations omitted).
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ple that they should not scream at their children. Though both de-
crease others' incentives to speak, only one group does so in a way we
recognize as unjustified. Alternatively, if really good government de-
creased the public's incentive to speak out on public affairs, because
there was no reason to complain, we• would not worry about First
Amendment problems. The distinction between acceptable silencing
and unacceptable, thus regulable, silencing is necessary and valid.
Since we can never escape choices about whose speech to favor, we
should focus on why we choose one group over another.
The free speech justification for copyright may also seem distinct
from other market failure arguments because it sounds in economics;
it is about cold-blooded economic calculation, not artistry and the joy
of creation. 158
 By contrast, the explanations for why pornography,
hate speech, or well-funded political campaigns can suppress others'
speech seem psychological and mushy. Economic rationality works
through psychological structures, of course, as any human motivation
does, but we are not accustomed to thinking of it that way. It seems
easier to say that people who feel threatened and oppressed by others'
speech should just grit their teeth and fight back with better ideas
than to say that people who are upset by others' copying should take
pride in the joy of creation itself and should be glad that their expres-
sion reaches so many people. Nevertheless, the other market-failure
theories can equally be described as problems of economic incentives,
just as authorship and creativity can readily be described in romantic
ways that ignore the influence of economic incentives.
The sante is true on the audience's end. Jack Balkin has recently
argued that all speech competes with other speech in an important
way—audience time is limited, and someone who is watching The X-
Files is not debating foreign policy at the local Republican Party head-
quarters. 159
 The real scarcity that is relevant to First Amendment
analysis is of people's time and attention, not of opportunities to
speak in any particular medium. Competition exists in non-
economic—or at least nonmonetized—registers as wel1. 160
tr." Standard copyright rhetoric merges the author and the entrepreneur, recognizing
that the author who has an interest in making money will contract with people who can
distribute her works. See Patterson, supra note 14, at 53-54. Even when we conceive of crea-
tivity as psychologically motivated, we expect that the impulse to get wide recognition for
that creativity will be economic; why else would a creator sell her rights to a publisher?
159 See Balkin, supra note 113, at 409.
ISO A related point is that speech is therefore, like other apparently unlimited "public"
goods, vulnerable to slow erosion. Some theorists argue that using an idea never "depletes"
it in the manner of a physical resource. See Mark A. Letnley, The Economics of Improvement in
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Once we accept that speech trades off with speech, it is simply a
matter of calculation to determine how much exposure to pornogra-
phy decreases a woman's incentive to participate in public life, or how
much spending by the major political parties decreases a new party's
ability to reach potential converts. 161 Then, if those disincentives are
unjustified, we need to figure out how to counteract them. Maybe
sometimes regulation would be more justified than in particular cases
of copying for fun and profit.
b. Copyfight's Effects on Content
Because the other market-failure theories are often rejected on
the grounds that they impermissibly regulate the content of speech, it
is useful to look in greater detail at copyright's effects on content. In a
world without copyright, information would be distributed differently.
There would probably be patrons of the arts, both governmental and
private, and the content of that art would be shaped by patrons' pref-
erences. Without copyright, coordination difficulties and free riding
problems would make it difficult for the less wealthy to aggregate
their resources and fund creativity; thus, as Neil Netanel argues,
wealth and power would likely have more influence on the kinds of
expression that would be readily distributed. 162 Conversely, copyright
encourages creators (and investors) toward works that may prove
popular with some market segment. The desire to give a mass audi-
ence what it will pay for, while not dispositive of content, makes a
significant difference in many creative decisions. 163 Copyright encour-
Thiellectual Thaperly Law, 75 Thx. L. REV. 989, 1045 (1997): Mcjohn, supra note 119, at 106-
07. But overexposure can drain an idea, or a kind of expression derived from that idea, of
vitality; consider Seinfeld and the Spice Girls. whether copyright protects against such
overexposure or encourages it is another question entirely.
ter c't D
..1COARD POSNER, SEX AND REasor4 284-90 (1992) (providing equation to de-
termine whether abortion should be banned). 1 do not mean that these calculations will
be easy or exact, just that factibulers (such as Congress) could gather relevant evidence
and judge its credibility.
162 See Neianel, supra note 63, al 288.
163 See Benkler, .supra note 151, at 400-08. Benkler argues that each increment of copy-
right protection encourages fin centralization, which harms democracy and diversity. I
understand him to be arguing about the negative effects of marginal increases in copy-
right, not copyright in general. See id. at 394 n.180, 401. 1 agree that a thin copyright fo-
cused on preserving incentives to create by protecting against wholesale, nontransforma-
tire copying would be best for speech. Especially as Benkler's explanation of why increased
rights increase centralization relies heavily on large organizations' ability to create deriva-
tive (Iransformative) works front their stockpiles, I doubt his analysis would produce widely
divergent results from mine.
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ages the creation and dissemination of the speech of those who seek
economic rewards, decreasing the relative voices of those who create
for personal satisfaction, for the glory of God, or for the respect and
praise of the audience.
Perhaps the model of television and radio programming would
exist in some modified form in the absence of copyright, so that in-
teresting stories would be available for free, their content pervaded
with ads so that the average consumer would sit through the ads to get
the story. In that case, we might expect that creators whose work does
not fit well next to an ad for Burger King fries would have a harder
time reaching an audience; as evidence for this proposition, consider
that the markets for books and even film are much more varied than
the television and radio markets.
Authorial self-help as described in Section I.0 above would likely
be popular, and media that would he easiest to copy-protect would
receive the most investment—computer disks that could be read once
and would then erase themselves, for example, instead of traditional
books. Self-help would have effects on content as well as form. Copy-
I suspect, however, that Benkler romanticizes the possibility of a less-copyrighted
world. fie argues that concentrated media systems are likely to exclude challenges to the
prevailing wisdom and translate unequal economic power into unequal power to set the
terms of public debate. See id. at 377-78. But how would small, diverse sources obtain a
wide audience without the possibility of large-corporation alliances for distribution, as his
exemplar Matt Drudge (briefly) did? Cf. David Segal, Big Record Labels Start to Like the Sound
of Online Music, WASIL Pos'r, jun. 30, 2000, at HI (discussing large labels' distributional
and content-sorting advantages). Also, because Benkler focuses on the individual as the
source of meaning, he appears to discount the value of C01111/1011 culture—in today's eco-
nomic langnage, the "network effects" of having The Wizard of Oz as a common referent.
Benkler does not fully defend the argument that concentrated media gi-
ants decrease diversity. Even Disney produces arguably blasphemous movies through an
affiliate. Some economic theory suggests that large corporations will supply some content
that appeals to specialized tastes as well as to the median taste in order to capture as much
of the market as possible; if a provider can offer only one TV channel, it may well program
for the median taste, but if it has three it may try to appeal to the top three groups. See,
e.g., Daniel L. Brenner, Ownership and Content Regulation in Merging and Emerging Media, 45
DEPAut. L. REV. 1009 (1996); Benjamin M. Compaine, The Impact of Ownership on Content:
Does it Matter?, 13 GARDozo ARTS & ENT. U. 755 (1995). Indeed, in my view, the risk that
combining conglomerate power with the modern ability to target subsets of an audience
will lead to too much fragmentation is at least as great as the risk of viewpoint homogeniza-
tion. Every reader can now receive a personalized newspaper telling her only about things
she already knows she cares about. The risk in this scenario is that we will lose any coin-
M011 culture. See Todd Gitlin, Public Spheres or Public Sphoicules?, in MEDIA, RITUAL AND
IDENTITY 168 (Tamar Liebes & James Curran eds., 1998); Elihu Katz, And Deliver Us from
Segmentation, in BREAKING UP AMERICA: ADVERTISERS AND THE NEW MEDIA WORLD (Roger
G. Noll & Monroe Joseph Turow eds., 1997). I believe that copyright and its limits can help
us navigate a path between Scylla and Charybdis.
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right encourages investment in entertainment over facts, as facts are
not copyrightable. If authors had to use other means to protect their
work, they would presumably be equally able to protect facts and
fictions, and therefore there would not be a copyright-induced skew
toward the fanciful.
The bias of copyright, pushing new work away from what has
gone before it, also has systematic effects on content and viewpoint. 164
Copyright favors expression that looks like a creative genius'; the fur-
ther an author gets from what has gone before, the more protection
he will get. 165 It does not recognize value in folklore or other tradi-
tional art forms whose richness consists in repetition of traditional
thernes. 166 Copyright favors high and mass culture over countercul-
ture and subculture, since marginal groups are more likely to express
themselves by unauthorized reliance on popular and well-known ma-
terials, while large corporations that have a "library" of proven charac-
ters will reuse winning formulas. 167 Copiers who borrow without per-
164 Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,776-77 (1978) (Brennan, j., dissenting)
(discussing how certain groups are proportionally more likely to express themselves tising
the seven dirty words, so suppression of broadcasts using those words will be systematically
biased against those groups and the viewpoints t hose groups are proportionally more likely
to hold).
165 Thus, facts get very little copyright protection no limiter how hard it was to unearth
them or express them, while fiction is heavily favored by comparison. Even within fiction, a
hierarchy of creativity prevails. A hackneyed plot with stock characters gets a thin copy-
right, see Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.), while
innovative, whimsical poppets living on their own strange island get much stronger protec-
tion, see Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., hie. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th
Cir. 1977). This allocation of rights favors the iconoclast. the author of Infinite Jest over the
author of a Harlequin Romance. Harlequin mid other romance publishers have style
guidelines that indicate exactly what sort of plots are acceptable, what type a jobs the hero
and heroine should have, what kind of premarital sexual activity is permissible. when first
sexual contact should occur, and how many words the novel should contain. See CAROL.
THURSTON, THE ROMANCE REVOLUTION: Eauric. NOVELS FOR WOMEN AND THE QUEST FOR
A NEW SEXUAL IDENTITY 223-26 (1987). Even one that net conventional standards of
'good writing" would have trouble proving that anything other than verbatim copying
constituted an infringement. Copyright also favors the kinds of creativity well have histori-
cally dominated over the kinds of creativity women have historically dominated, since
women's art has often been -Variations on a thenie, like quilting, instead of distinct crea-
tions. See Shelley Wright, A Feminist Exploration of the Legal Protection of Art, 7 CAN. j. WOMCN
& L. 59,90-94 (1994).
106 See, e.g., Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual
Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1997). I do not endorse Farley's notion that copy-
right's boundaries should be expanded and its term extended in perpetuity to protect
folklore, but she cogently sets forth the ways in which copyright's definitions exclude what
many people consider the most valuable aspecis of traditional culuire.
167 See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581. F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978); jEtsoNs, su-
pra note 48; Coombe, Objects of Property, supra note 82; Nets Jacobson. Note. Faith, Hope Ca'
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mission and then add their own content tend to be making fun, mak-
ing light, attacking the • conventional; they do not have a "stable" of
well-recognized character and situations. 168
 Such copiers do not set
the agenda of public discussion. They generally lack name recogni-
tion on their own—to get people to pay attention, they may need to
trade on names and situations we already know. 169
 The owners of
popular products, by contrast, have an incentive to keep their most
popular products from close association with anything unpopular or
unsettling.
Despite these predictable effects, copyright can be defended as
content-neutral in aim. It could be that punishing copying that de-
stroys the economic incentive to speak by substituting for a creator's
speech and satisfying demand is like prohibiting the interruption of a
public speaker. John Hart Ely persuasively argues that prohibiting in-
terruption, even by "the most coherent and trenchant political com-
mentary," would be perfectly constitutional because the underlying
value protected by the regulation would be the right of the original
speaker to speak and the audience to listen, and those rights are not
dependent on the message of the interrupter or even on the fact that
the interrupter has a message. Interruption that agrees or disagrees
with the speaker threatens the values sought to be protected."° Like-
wise, pure copying, whatever the underlying intent, harms speech and
thus can be prohibited. Yet, as Part I explained, many copyright cases
do not involve pure copying. Also, questions remain regarding
whether certain speakers are more likely to benefit from an anti-
interruption/copying regulation and whether the regulation will pre-
vent the interrupter/copier from speaking at all.
Parody: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, "Oh, Pretty Woman," and Parodists' Rights, 31 "loos. L. REV.
955, 1015-18 (1994). Rosemary Coombe notes that copyright piracy is often carried out by
immigrants struggling to survive and others at the margin of American society. See Rose-
mary J. Coombe, Tin' Cultural Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches to Law and Society in
Conditions of Globalization, 10 Am. U. INT'', L. & PoCY 791, 817-18 (1995).
L6B See Mark Gunderson, Copyright ... For Poorer or Richer; at Inip://www.icomm.ca/
macos/copyriteaxt (last visited Jan. 15, 1999); VitComm, Copyright Law Is Wrong, at
lutp://www.cyborganic. com/people/vircomm/projects/anti-copy
 (last visited Jan. 15,
1999). This could be described as a problem of risk aversion—copyright owners do not
want to risk the value of their property, and thus they are less likely to make really creative
or controversial use of their works than copiers are. SeeNIcjohn, supra note 116, at 106.
" See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Rogers v. Koons,
960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (one of several cases involving "appropriation artist" Jeff Koons
who copies elements of popular works as sardonic commentary on them); Air Pirates, 581
F.2d 751.
"'John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 LIAM% L. REV. 1482, 1499 (1975).
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Frederick Schauer argues that mechanisms that repress speech
are all-pervasive, in norms about polite or appropriate speech, in con-
ventions that limit what will be understood as intelligible communica-
tion, and in other varied pressures that lead people to watch their
words. In this view, censorship, in the sense of external forces bearing
on individual communication, is everywhere; the question is what
kinds the government should regulate when it participates, as it must,
in shaping those forces.ln Meanwhile, Wendy Gordon argues for
broad rights to use pre-existing creative works on the ground that
some works essentially reach out and grab audiences. A person who
has been powerfblly affected by a work may feel a sense of constraint,
a need to respond to the thoughts and feelings generated by exposure
to the initial work. 172
Schauer and Gordon are describing two aspects of the same phe-
nomenon, as prior works are part of the environment that shapes
what stories we want to tell and even what we can imagine telling.
Copyright generates works that affect what will be created thereafter,
not just by prohibiting pure copying and by directly encouraging
variation, but also by altering the background universe of information
that provides the raw material for the next generation, in the literal
sense of the word. Government thus participates in encouraging some
kinds of content and discouraging others.
2. Differences Between Market-Failure-Based Regulation's:
Infringement ContraSted to Hate Speech and Pornography
Copyright is a regime that affects a large amount of speech, but
seems relatively content-neutral, and in evaluating it we have to ask
exactly how stringently the First Amendment requires us to evaluate
content-neutral speech regulations. Perhaps surprisingly, the breadth
of copyright's effects becomes a factor in its favor, while the more tar-
geted radical theories seem more suspect. The following subsections
explore the family of speech-versus-speech claims by contrasting copy-
right to the regulation of hate speech and pornography.
a. Bon-owing Versus Attacking
What is really at stake in the evaluation of speech-versus-speech
claims is a judgment about what options people should have to re-
171 SeeSc ►auer, Ontology, supra note
172 See Gordon, A Property Right in Self:Expression, supra note 116.
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pined to speech that in some way harms them. As Kent Greenawalt
has noted, the democratic aim of promoting courageous citizens, "in-
dependent of mind and hardy emotionally," does not mean that all
kinds of hardiness are equally desirable goals for First Amendment
jurisprudence. 173
 Greenawalt argues that fortitude in the face of seri-
ous and imminent threats of violence is not the kind of hardiness that
is valuable for democratic citizenship; thus, penalizing such threats
does not conflict with the goal of creating robust and vigorous citizen-
communicators. 174
 Similarly, willingness to create in the absence of
the economic incentives generated by copyright is not the kind of
hardiness that we should require of speakers. The question is what
other kinds of hardiness government should or should not demand of
its citizens.
One obvious distinction between copyright and the regulation of
racist and pornographic speech is that the mechanisms by which "si-
lencing" works in the two cases are different. Richard Delgado re-
cently described the speech-versus-speech justification for regulating
hate speech: "[h] ate messages also make the task of the minority
speaker harder, because of the toll that they take on the credibility of
speakers of color. . . . The very satne message from a woman will register
differently from one delivered by a man." 75
 He concludes that
[b]ecause the message is the same, irrespective of the
speaker, the reason for the different reception cannot lie in
the words themselves . . . [T] he only possible origin of this
different credibility lies in the system of stories and messages
that we choose to tell about, and to, minorities and
women—in short, hate speech. 176
The speech of A, then, deprives B of effective speech, the one value
that a First Amendment absolutist cannot deny. 177
The economic motivations to buy or use an infringer's product
can be unrelated to the literal message of the infringed material,




 Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of the First Amendment, 113 HARV. L.
RI:v. 778, 792-93 (2000) (reviewing Steven H. Shiffrin, DISSENT, INjusTic,E, AND THE
MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999)) (emphasis added).
176 Id.
177 See id. Copying and hate speech are not different just because a minority speaker's
incentives and attractiveness are affected by speech distant in time and place. Copyright,
too, assumes that the regime governing speech in general will affect future instances Of
speech.
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while the connection between the cognitive biases invoked by rac-
ist/sexist speech and the oppressive messages of that speech is strong.
In other words, racist speech may destroy a minority speaker's credi-
bility or otherwise short-circuit cognitive mechanisms for evaluating
speech, but the persuasive mechanism by which such suppression
works is itself arguably deserving of protection. Infringement, on the
other hand, makes a copyright owner's speech economically unattrac-
tive: Why buy a newspaper when you can get the stories for free? The
copier is not the enemy of the creator's viewpoint, only of his or her
livelihood. 178 The infringer is piggybacking on the first speaker, while
other speakers are using their targets in an entirely different way—
grinding them down. Where piggybacking is not primarily
antagonistic to the first speaker, despite its negative effects on
incentives, racist and pornographic speech is. Certainly, regulations of
hate speech and pornography can be defended on the ground that
such speech inflicts harm on the people it targets, but that rationale
stands in contrast to copyright's encouragement of disagreement.
In fact, the fair use doctrine's preference for parody and criticism
parallels the argument against regulating hate speech. The argument
is as follows: There are some harms to incentives to speak that the
government cannot take into account when considering whether or
not to regulate. In copyright, those harms are (at least) harms to in-
centives that may occur when vicious reviews or parodies suppress
demand for a work. This is either because the interpretation of the
parodist/reviewer is more important to free expression than the di-
minished incentive to create new works that might be savaged, or be-
cause the effect on incentives conies not through pure economic sub-
stitution but through some other mechanism. 1 would argue that the
former proposition is hound up with the latter.
Valuing criticism over "original" creation raises the specter of
content bias. Yet it can be defended as a way to keep people believing
in the marketplace of ideas, since a good review is probably more
credible in a world that allows had reviews. This is a concern for
proper marketplace functioning, a regulatory concern. It also paral-
378 As discussed in Section 1.B, this distinction between copyright and the radical theo-
ries does not track the actual law of copyright, which often imposes liability on a copier
whose viewpoint is clearly distinct from that of the copyright owner or who participates in
a different market, for example by parodying the copyrighted material. Nevertheless, mite
distinction between types of speech incentives and disincentives can be defended if we
distinguish econontic barn is from dignitary harms and defend copyright only as a re-
sponse to the former.
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leis the traditional truth-finding rationale for free speech; criticism,
even false or erroneous criticism, is valuable because it tests the value
of prior works and received wisdom. Furthermore, if criticism is al-
lowed but pure substitution is not, there are still large incentives to
create. Therefore, it is reasonable to value criticism or parody over an
attacked work when the two conic into conflict.
Perhaps racist speech and pornography are so much like criti-
cism and parody that, even if they affect incentives to speak, they still
should not be regulated. Nonetheless, the analogy between the two
speech-conflict situations is still useful. In both .cases we may recog-
nize that an "unregulated" speech market is subject to skewing in fa-
vor of some speakers; there is no natural pregovernmental level of
unconstrained speech. Furthermore, infringement and racist speech
may operate by different noncognitive mechanisms, but the objection
in both cases is that the mechanisms are fundamentally unfair. Pro-
ponents of hate speech regulation and the like believe that silencing
through the coercive power of racial epithets is wrong, just as copy-
right defenders believe that silencing through the limitation of eco-
nomic incentives is wrong.
b. The Relationship Between Content Neutrality and Mechanisms of Silencing
Copyright, unlike the radical theories, seems content- and view-
point-neutral on its face. The decision to classify , a regulation as con-
tent-based or content-neutral, however, depends upon the categoriza-
tion of the mechanism by which dangeroits speech does harm. That
is, the neutrality argument is ultimately a characterization of the ef-
fects of the kinds of speech likely to be suppressed by regulation. To
see this point, take a standard example: the regulation of inciting
speech that creates a clear and present danger of violence. Unlike
regulation of racially derogatory fighting words, regulation of the en-
tire category seems viewpoint-neutral. Anyone who advocates innni-
nent violence in a way that is likely to succeed in triggering such vio-
lence will he punished; whether the violence is in support of
segregation or socialism, the advocacy is illegal. The proponent of vio-
lence could, however, characterize the regulation as viewpoint-based.
People who express the belief that violence is a good idea—at least
those who are likely to persuade others to agree—can be punished,
but those who express the opposite viewpoint, that nonviolence is the
appropriate way to effect change, will never be punished. As with a law
dividing pregnant persons from nonpregnant persons, it turns out
that only one side loses.
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One response to this criticism is that the advocacy of imminent
violence does what it does in a different way than the advocacy of
peaceful change, by destroying the audience's ability to reflect on
what it bears, which brings us back to the different-mechanisms ar-
gument. 1" The argument that speech that destroys a listener's ability
to abstain from violence is not persuasion but coercion is one plausi-
ble characterization, but there are others. In a real sense, if I say "Let's
take the damn street now" and my followers do so, I have been per-
suasive even if I have also been inarticulate. The persuasive power of
any argument often depends on an audience's preexisting biases and
favored concepts or code words, and deciding that some argument
operates outside the register of persuasion is tricky business. I will not
attempt to resolve the issue; I use the example simply to demonstrate
that the determination that a regulation is content- or viewpoint-
neutral will ultimately depend on judgments about how different
kinds of speech work.
Therefore, an infringer, particularly one who takes only parts of a
copyrighted work, could well argue that infringement expresses the
viewpoint that copying is good and that there is nothing new under
the sun. 180 Popular anti-copyright rhetoric contains many such state-
ments. 181 No matter what the content of the infringed material, only
infringement can express this viewpoint in the most persuasive way,
because only infringement shows the audience what infringement is
good for
Copyright protects noninfringing materials, never infringing ma-
terials; it embodies the viewpoint that infringement is bad. This is only
neutral if infringement operates on the universe of available speech
in a way that differs from noninfringement, a way whose harms are
more extensive than the harms of other kinds of speech. The harmful
incentive effects of infringement make it plausible to treat copyright
179 Kent Greenawalt makes a similar move. He recognizes that prohibitions on encour-
aging political assassination and violent revolution favor peaceful ideologies over violent
ones, but argues that "the preference flu ' urging obedience to law over urging violence is
not itself the kind of preference that is strongly at odds with a principle of free speech."
even if it may have uneven effects on differing viewpoints. GREENAWALT, supra note 173, at
122. To !inn, the bait on criminal advocacy (if cabined to require au imminent likelihood
of harm) is an acceptable content jiidgment, perhaps like other acceptable content judg-
ments that favor local television stations over cable providers or creators of copyrightable
works over infringers (also narrowly tailored).
18° CI Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 5119, .611 11.6 (1098)
dissenting) (discussing the "communicative element inherent in the 'cry act of inildhig
(art] itself").
181 See supra nine 55.
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as a neutral regulation, since copyright targets a mechanism of
speech-suppression and not a viewpoint as such. Note, however, that
arguments for regulating hate speech, pornography, and campaign
finance similarly characterize their targets as behavior with effects on
the market for speech. Under the radical theories, it is acceptable to
say that women are inferior or that the rich should pay no taxes, so
long as that speech does not use the (particularly powerful) mecha-
nisms of sexually explicit subordination or saturation political adver-
tis ino82
The distinction between copyright and pornography or hate
speech regulation is therefore bottomed on an evidentiary disagree-
ment. Both theories look at audience response to regulation or a lack
thereof. We are confident enough about how economic rationality
works that we can predict how unredressed infringement will affect
the production of speech. Without copyright, some people will create
because creation is independently satisfying, and some people will still
pay creators, whether as patrons of the arts or out of a sense of moral
obligation, but the addition of economic incentives has a significant
effect on the level of speech. By contrast, mechanisms of silencing
through racist speech and pornography are far less clear. Theories of
human psychology can explain the mechanisms, but they seem less
intuitively obvious to many people today than the idea that money
motivates action. 183
 Pornography and hate speech promote inequality,
and one effect of that is to harm the victims as speakers, but the proc-
ess seems more diffusely connect to silencing than infringement is,
even if the amount of silencing is as great or greaten
In addition, much discomfort with proposed regulations of por-
nography (and•hate speech) comes from the perceived impossibility
of tailoring regulation to that which silences women. A variety of non-
sexually-explicit demeaning images and stories affect women's ability
to speak and be heard. Against that background, it is hard to imagine
that eliminating pornography would materially affect women's speech
incentives or credibility. Ironically, copyright's breadth seems more
acceptable as an incentive scheme because its wide coverage makes it
more likely to achieve its goal. Inquiry into mechanisms of silencing
suggests a version of a tailoring requirement. A speech-promoting
speech restriction should be targeted to cover bad, speech-
182
 See, e.g. IslAcKINNoN, supra note 138, at 108.
183 Bi1 ef. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 1 l l 1-1ARy. L. REV. 1149
(1998); Weinreb, Fair Use, supra note 79, at 1305-06 (noting the absence of significant
empirical evidence about copyright's incentive effects).
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suppressing speech. If it covers substantially more or less than that,
then the law is not really promoting speech. Copyright law does not
currently work this way, but it should.
c. Diversity
Copyright seems to be content-neutral because it regulates all
speech. 184 By contrast, racist and pornographic speech often have a
predictable and politically charged content. Yet, copyright's interest in
promoting diversity and new expression is, ultimately, content-based
in the sense that the term is usually used. We usually demand that
mechanisms of speech regulation be content-neutral because we fear
government oppression, but we have a legitimate content-based pref-
erence for a rich and diverse array of speech. 185 Thus, copyright sug-
gests that certain broad content-based preferences are acceptable
justifications for government regulation.
When courts and commentators declare that protecting authors'
expression ensures a wide variety of expression rather than a flood of
copies, they invoke diversity principles. 186 Diversity is a preference for
certain kinds of content: new expression that would be less prevalent
in the absence of regulation. 187 Ex ante, diversity might seem neutral,
because Congress cannot be sure when it establishes a copyright law
whoSe ox will be gored, just as legislatures cannot be sure who will use
a libel law. The content discrimination comes in ex post, when a pref-
erence for variety over repetition punishes copiers and favors trans-
formative uses."8 In the case of libel law, at least, the ex post effects
181 See Fraser, sepia note 17, at 10.
185 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 19 (1945) ("[The First Amend-
ment] rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information front
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is
a condition of a free society.").
188 See Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 677 (O'Connor, j„ Concurring and dissenting in part)
("Preferences For diversity of viewpoints, for location, for educational programming, and
fin• news and public affairs all make reference to content.").
187 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'it, 475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986) ("iT1he
State's asserted interest in exposing appellant's customers to a variety of viewpoints is
not—and does not purport to be—content neutral"); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 124, at
2447. Then-justice Rehnquisi's dissent, by contrast, argues that government decisions that
affect the mix of content available to the public arc not problematic unless the action "ap-
proximates that of direct content•based suppression of speech." Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 29
(Rehnquist, j., dissenting).
188 See Volokh & McDonnell„suprn note 57, at 2447 (1Clopyright liability turns on the
content of what is published. True, the law draws no ideological But while
this might make the law viewpoint-neutral, it doesn't make it content-neutral.").
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that disadvantage defendants are enough to subject libel law to fairly
intense judicial scrutiny.09
The upshot of the diversity preference is that copyright has a dis-
parate impact on various kinds of works and speakers. Yet it is not
clear that the First Amendment erects any barrier to neutral laws that,
although reasonable and limited, nonetheless have a disparate impact
on some group, especially if that group is not historically disadvan-
taged.
Radical theorists argue for a change in government regulation
precisely on the grounds that the speech suppressed under the cur-
rent regime should be more widely available. We need government to
balance the scales so that certain disfavored people have a chance to
be heard. Some of the radical theorists think they know what these
unheard voices would say; others remain more agnostic. As a matter
of democratic self-governance, it may be troubling that any group is
silenced no matter what it might say, and particular attention to the
silence of historically disadvantaged groups makes constitutional
sense (for Fourteenth Amendment, Carolene Products
-type reasons).
Perhaps copyright is less troubling than other market-failure
theories because copyright promotes diversity of expression, not diver-
sity of ideas, and only the latter is a troubling kind of diversity prefer-
ence. But recall the argument of Part LA that expression and ideas
are intertwined in ways that are difficult to sort out. Ideas have no
form without expression. Furthermore, without copyright, no one
would have property rights in ideas in any event; the incentive to have
a "new" idea and clothe it in expression could well be diminished
without copyright. Therefore, copyright's protection for ideas works
in tandem with its protection of expression.tg°
The bias of copyright may differ in another way from the biases
in other speech-promoting regulations. Copyright's goal is not just
189
 The fear is either that libel law will have a disparate impact on certain groups that
will be impossible to tease out case-by-case or that too mulch speech will be suppressed
regardless of whether any identifiable group is affected. As I argued in Section LA, one
could make the same case against copyright.
190
 While copyright's main incentive function is to encourage varied expression, that in
itself tends to encourage different viewpoints and different subjects. Even the relatively
idea-free example of Hollywood moviemaking shows how the principle works. Titanic was a
success, but only one studio reaped the direct monetary benefits of the movie; others had
to figure out how to take advantage of the audience's passion !O• the story. Thus Leonardo
DiCaprio gets to star in many other movies, with different stories; thus we get another
slimmer of disaster films; thus we get a slew of period pieces. All these are strategies for
taking part of Titanic, some part that copyright does not protect, and turning it into copy-
righted gold. In the process. we get different ideas, not just different expression.
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diversity but amount of speech—let a thousand novels bloom. I do not
believe that the distinction between diversity and amount of speech is
meaningful, however. One could make the same claim about cam-
paign finance reform, hate speech regulation, antipornography ordi-
nances, and so on. Such restrictions would enable many voices hereto-
fore silent to begin speaking, regardless of what those voices might
say. More fundamentally, the spatial metaphor for measuring speech
becomes fairly useless at this point. Assume that, without copyright,
people would spend less time communicating their thoughts to one
another, since there would be less profit in it. We would have to make
up our own stories to entertain ourselves individually. Would there
really be "fewer" stories? Or would we have the "same" number of
thoughts, only less advanced because they would not be enriched by
others'? While I believe that two people may well improve the logic
and persuasiveness of their beliefs by exchanging ideas, I am not sure
it is appropriate to say that the "number" of ideas changes through
communication. Copyright lends itself to counting more easily than
other forms of speech regulation, perhaps, because it is easier to
measure the number of magazines on a shelf than it is to measure di-
versity of viewpoints. But that still does not tell us whether a billion
copies of a biography of Leonardo DiCaprio is a better free speech
goal than ten thousand copies each of ten thousand different biogra-
phies.
"More" speech is not just about having more alternative view-
points or novels from which to choose, but about having more tools
with which to make new speech. Diversity in the marketplace is usually
conceived of at static slices of time: more choices for consumers
means more diversity. Diversity of speech is a different animal, as the
theory behind copyright demonstrates; the variety available at one
time affects what will be available later on. The preference for a dy-
namic diversity, one that allows speakers to generate new speech, is a
content preference, but it is a justified one.
Whatever one thinks of the regulation of hate speech and por-
nography, comparison with copyright theory is useful to identify
grounds on which one could promote or condemn particular gov-
ernment actions that penalize some speakers to encourage others. Iii
the end, whether a regulation is "content-based" may not be as impor-
tant as whether we can define and defend its predictable effects on
various groups of speakers.
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3. Campaign Finance Reform
Campaign finance reform raises similar questions of whether a
speech regulation designed to improve one group's access to speech,
which therefore has a predictable disparate impact on a different
group, is legitimate.
The strongest justifications for campaign finance reform rest on
some theory that lack of regulation has poisoned the system by which
information about candidates gets to voters. 191 The general idea is
that no one really wants the situation we have, but that most partici-
pants are forced to play the big-spending game because of a collective
action problem, a Prisoner's Dilemma. Some proponents of reform
argue that unlimited spending by candidates leads to a system in
which challengers (who may have difficulty getting contributions
when challenging a proven candidate) or less wealthy candidates are
drowned out. 192 Large modern campaigns require huge "war chests,"
which in turn drives politicians to solicit wealthy donors or interest
groups, creating a system in which money buys influence)" Justice
Breyer has thus endorsed the proposition that campaign finance
regulation is justified as a speech-promoting speech restriction, pre-
venting the few from drowning out the many) 94
Still another argument for reform is that modern campaigning is
an "arms race" in which, for defensive reasons, politicians have to
spend so much time on fund-raising that they have no time for gov-
ernance. Some speech and deliberation—fund-raising speech—
crowds out speech and deliberation about what to do in office. Cam-
paign finance reform, then, will not necessarily change the range of
views available to the public, but it will improve the quality of public
service. Regulation of campaign finance will, it is argued, produce
191 See David A. Strauss, Mat Is the Coal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. Cm. LE-
GAL F. 141 (discussing viirious justifications proffered by reformers).
152 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2470, 2479-80 (1997)
[hereinafter Fiss, Money and Politicsi (arguing that a democratic understanding of the First
Amendment reqnires the equalization' of political opportunity through regulations on
campaign spending).
1" See FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985)
(stating that "preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption" is "the only legiti-
mate compelling government interest thus far identified for restricting campaign
finances"); Fiss. Money and Polities, supra note 192, at 2478-79 (arguing that unrestricted
campaign finance spending gives untoward power to the wealthy, distorting political equal-
ity contrary to First Amendment principles).
194
 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 120 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
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more democratic deliberation. 195 Just as copyright can be attacked for
promoting the interests of wealthy corporations, campaign finance
reform is often criticized as an incunthent-protection measure, In-
cumbents have greater access to non-monetary assets such as an abil-
ity to get free media exposure and name recognition. Therefore, the
argument goes, campaign finance reform, by restricting campaign
expenditures, will increase the relative importance of these incum-
bent-favoring assets.
In the campaign finance context, the Supreme Court held that it
is a content preference to fear that some speech, because it is backed
by deep pockets, will drown out other speech. To the Court, campaign
finance regulations evinced a content-based concern with communi-
cative impact. 196 Campaign finance reformers, by contrast, consider
regulation content-neutral, a concern with the volume of speech
rather than its ideas. But, because the "volume" of political ads bears a
fairly clear relationship to their ability to persuade, and the volume of
a loudspeaker does riot, the Court saw content discrimination. Like
the different-mechanisms argument discussed in the preceding sub-
section, this judgment depends on the characterization of money as
something that enables speech rather than as a mechanism by which
certain speech makes its mark on the world.
In tandem with its characterization of limits on campaign spend-
ing as content-based, the Supreme Court rejected the democratic,
speech-equalization rationales for campaign finance reform, on the
theory that the speech of some should not be suppressed to enhance
the relative voice of others.'97 Like copyright, there is no ex ante re-
striction, but once the political season begins, the restrictions affect
who can speak or what can be said. 198 Also like copyright, campaign
finance reform challenges us • to recognize the relation between
money and speech—money generates speech, in copyright by
financing the production and distribution of speech, and similarly in
"5 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the tVidening Gyre of Fund-Raising: My Cam-
paign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 Comm. L. REN. 1281
(1994).
751 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976).
1 °7 See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U,S. 290, 298-300
(1981); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. Academic critics of campaign finance reform also argue
that government nonintervention is the natural baseline for a regime of lice speech. See,
e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94
Comm. L. REV. 1258, 1260-61 (1994).
"8 See Blasi, supra note 195, at 1292 (discussing ways in which facially neutral campaign
finance reform might favor certain ideological interests over others).
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campaign finance. The desire for money affects the content of indi-
vidual speakers' speech, as publishers seek to produce popular mate-
rial or candidates solicit the support of wealthy donors.
Copyright and campaign finance reform are linked not only by
their market-failure theories but also by a concern for democracy, in
the sense that both theories postulate that citizens should have access
to many speakers saying many different things. Some people criticize
the radical theories because they seem to make the state responsible
for deciding what is good for people, deciding which stories have not
been sufficiently successful in reaching a sympathetic audience. Rob-
ert Post, for example, finds Owen Fiss's emphasis on getting 'informa-
tion out into the public sphere so that people can decide how to vote
unappealing because it "offers a strikingly passive image of the demo-
cratic citizen, who can he brought to identify with collective self-
determination merely by being provided with ... full and accurate
information."199
The radical theorists, however, disagree with this characterization
because to them there should be no easy line between speakers and
audiences. Currently, some people talk too much when they should
be listening, and vice versa, but that is not inevitable. Integrating
copyright into other theories about how the state constructs the con-
ditions for speech helps illuminate how no citizen, on either the crea-
tive/speaking or the copying/listening side, is passive. Copyright's
understanding of how audiences can rework expression to suit their
own purposes suggests that even what we think of as passive listening
may be more active than sharp distinctions between listening and
speaking admit. Access to multiple viewpoints is important not just so
citizens can choose, but so they can create their own viewpoints.
Campaign finance reform has similarly democratic aspirations, as it
attempts to enhance the political voice of groups that may currently
lack the means to be heard, both by directly decreasing the impor,
tance of money and by elimihating the fund-raising pressures that
may lead politicians to devote insufficient time to the issues.
A distinction between campaign finance reform and copyright
may therefore rest on predictions about the groups affected by the
two regulations. Campaign finance reform affects rich people,. a
group that seems smaller and more stable—thus more politically vul-
199 Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendmentjurisprudence, 95 NItcll. L. REV.
1517, 1526 (1997) (reviewing OWEN FIBS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH 8.:
TIIE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996)).
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nerable—than the authors protected by copyright (never mind that
the real beneficiaries of copyright are often from the same group).
Various aspects of First Amendment law are structured to mini-
mize disparate effects on identifiable groups, as with libel law, where
we predict that unconstrained juries will be too sympathetic to the
powerful and unsympathetic to their challengers to preserve vigorous
reporting and editorializing. Campaign finance reform raises the
same concerns. Similarly, we ought to see copyright, and its excep-
dons, as a law with predictable content-based effects, which shook!
therefore be subject to some heightened review. Because of copy-
right's breadth, however, the standard tests for constitutionality of
speech regulations may be too stringent; copyright, and perhaps other
regulations, may deserve scrutiny limited to the reasonableness of
Congress's line-drawing. But when speech is directly regulated, is the
inquiry ever limited to mere rationality as with a standard economic
regulation, or must courts demand something more from Congress?
The next section addresses that question.
4. Turner Broadcasting and Semi-Content-Neutral Regulation
Must-carry regulations are the only speech-promoting regulations
upheld in their entirety in recent years. The Court's articulation of a
theory that allowed these regulations to persist, despite their substan-
tial and direct effects on cable providers' speech, provides valuable
guidance for what serious First Amendment analysis of copyright
would look like.
Must-carry regulations ensure that cable systems carry local
broadcasters at no charge, if the broadcasters so desire. The fear that
prompted enactment of the must-carry law was that cable providers
would shut local broadcasters out of their systems, thus destroying the
local stations that had served regional populations for decades before
the development of cable. Local stations, in theory, carry local news,
as well as educational and informational programming that might not
otherwise be found on cable. 200 The crowding-out of local stations was
linked to cable technology, which made it inconvenient for a viewer to
switch back and forth between cable and local broadcast.
2" This is in part because the government requires broadcast licensees to serve !he
public interest by offering such programming, while it does 1101 similarly demand public
interest programming from cable providers, though it does require that cable providers
allow certain favored groups (local government and educational organizations) to access
some cable channels.
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The Turner I Court held that the mere assertion of dysfunction
or failure in a speech market, without more, is not sufficient to shield
a speech regulation from the First Amendment standards applicable
to nonbroadcast media."201
 The Court emphasized that laws that sin-
gle out the press are always subject to some heightened First Amend-
ment scrutiny. 242 The Court then invoked United States u O'Brien2°3 as
the basis for its analysis, despite very different situations. O'Brien con-
cerned a regulation banning the destruction of draft cards that was
Used to prosecute an antiwar protester. It set forth a test for conduct
regulations that have an incidental impact on expression, whereas the
Cable Act directly regulated expression.
The Turner I Court used O'Brien because it found that none of
Congress's interests in must-carry were related to the suppression of
free expression. 204
 In fact, the multiplication of information sources is
"a governmental purpose of the highest order." 205 The Court, how-
ever, demanded a showing that the threatened harms to free televi-
sion, diversity of information sources, and fair competition in the
programming market were real and that regulation would alleviate
those harms in a direct and material way. 206 In addition, the govern-
ment had the burden of showing that its regulation did not burden
substantially more speech than necessary. 207 Thus, the Court deferred
to Congress as a fact-finder; once it determined that Congress had
carried out its fact-finding responsibilities, it accorded great weight to
the problems Congress identified and the remedies Congress chose.
At the same time, the Court scrutinized the Cable Act carefully in or-
der to determine whether, if the facts were as Congress found them to
be, the Act regulated only as much speech as necessary to achieve
Congress's aims.
The Turner I Court justified its somewhat relaxed test for direct
regulation of speech on the ground that the must-carry law was con-
2°1 Turner I, 512 U.S. at 640.
202 See id. at. 640-41.
2"' 391 U.S. 367 (1068).
2°1 See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662.
()5
 Id. at 663. Justice Breyer's Turner II concurrence explicitly recognized that the
Court was balancing speech interests on both sides—cable carriers on one, the public in-
terest in having a wide variety of sources available on the other. See Turner 11, 520 U.S. at
226 (Breyer, J., coni:urring). Because important First Amendment interests existed on both
sides, Justice Breyer found that the key question was one of "fit." The Court had to deter-
mine whether significantly less restrictive alternatives existed and whether the balance
between speech-enhancing and speech-restricting functions was reasonable. See id.
206 See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 664.
2°7 See id. at 664-65.
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tent-neutral. The test for content neutrality, it stated, was whether the
government adopted a regulation because of agreement or disagree-
ment with a message. 208 Also, laws that "by their terms distinguish fa-
vored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views
expressed are content based."209 This definition seems like a better
description of viewpoint regulation, since we usually think of content-
based regulations as covering obscenity, libel, or other classes of
speech that may have a broad range of "messages." Indeed, Justice
O'Connor declared in dissent that Congress's preference for the topics
covered by broadcast stations—local news, public affairs, educational
programs, etc.—constituted a content preference. 210
208 See id. at 642.
209 Id. at 645.
2t0 T'urner I also seems to conflict with Hurley r1. Irish-Ameriean Gay, Lesbian 	 Bisexual
Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), the parade case. Hurley noted that the organizers of Boston's
St. Patrick's Day parade let in multiple messages, often disconnected from one another, so
that it was hard to say that there was any particular theme to the parade. See id. at 569. Vet
"a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by coniliinhig
farious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate all exact message as the exclusive
subject matter of the speech." Id. at 569-70. Even though there was no particular message,
the panicle could not be forced to add amit her message-thread to the overall tapestry.
tiftriq distinguished Turner I because the ifurky Court thought that people
would believe that the organizers endorsed any signs in the parade, evenI though the evi-
dence showed that the organizers almost never exercised control over signs. See Id. at 575.
The Court found that parades are not disconnected units like television programming but
unified wholes, even when they lack a unified message. See id. at 576, This distinction seems
mistaken. Like a parade, television is often perceived as a unified experience, with dispa-
rate interlaced segments reflecting on one another. See, e.g.JAmEs B. Twrrcuw., CARNI-
VAL CULXURE: THE TRASHING OF TASTE IN AMERICA 195-96 (1992) (discussing st u dies on
television watching habits that reveal that average viewers treat watching as a process rather
than as a series of discrete events). Moreover, cable operators cannot. disclaim any en-
dorsement of' NBC or PBS, because they are prohibited by law from altering the broadcast
signal on retransmission, so the Court's conclusion that cable operators can dissociate
themselves from must-carry channels is not persuasive. The Court believed that "given
cable's long history of serving as a conduit for broadcast signals, there appears little risk
that cable viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system con-
vey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator:" Turner I, 512 U.S. al 655. That lung
history, however, was not produced by must-carry; carriage was voluntary, and the natural
assumption of the average viewer would more likely be drat broadcast carriage, like car-
riage of HBO and Showtime, was and continued to he the result of the cable operator's
choice. The Court noted that viewers are frequently apprised of the broadcaster's identity.
See id. Yet parade-goers in Boston were apprised of GLIB's identity, and the bill recipients
were apprised of' the public interest group's identity in Pacific Gas &Electric Co. to Hudson,
It was the forced inclusion of another's views, despite the explicit identification of that
other, that the Court found objectionable in those cases. Finally, the Murky Court also
invoked monopoly considerations to distinguish Tirrner I "The Government's interest in
Turner Broadcasting was not the alteration of speech, but the survival of speakers." Thrrim.
515 U.S. at 577. The Court also emphasized that it was clear which message the parade
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Despite the conceptual difficulties, however, the Court found that
the crust-carry provisions were content-neutral because they required
carriage of broadcast stations regardless of the views those stations
expressed. 211
 The Court also found that the congressional purpose of
maintaining access to free television for all Americans was content-
neutral. According to the Court, Congress was not saying that broad-
cast was more valuable than cable, just that it had value. 212 This seems
disingenuous, since Congress fairly clearly was expressing a prefer-
ence for local programming over the alternatives that would other-
wise appear on the cable channels reserved for must-carry. It might be
more accurate to say that must-carry is reasonably content-neutral,
and that the categories of speech it prefers are broad enough to be
acceptable, especially given the inevitable clash between cable and
broadcast speech created by the characteristics of the television-
viewing audience.
Turner I and Turner II, which upheld Congress's balancing of in-
terests after a full examination of the record, leave a very uncertain
impression of what kind of congressional findings will suffice to justify
a speech regulation. 2" O'Brien itself did not distinguish between situa-
tions in which Congress was attentive to fact-finding and those in
which it was not. It applied a very deferential test in a case where
Congress did not have much evidence before it. But the Turner cases
appear to modify that test, applying it to direct regulation of expres-
sion and holding that deference is appropriate, while requiring that
organizers disfavored, by letting in so many and excluding so few. See id. at 574. It is less
clear which message cable providers were trying to exclude when they opposed must-carry.
2" See nowt.
 1, 512 U.S. at 643-44. When the D.C. Circuit analyzed other provisions of
the Cable Act, it used Turner analysis to uphold provisions mandating leased access to a
percentage of channels on cable systems reserved for programmers unaffiliated with cable
operators. The Court held that there was no content discrimination involved because the
law's preference operated in favor of certain speakers—those unaffiliated with cable com-
panies—and not in favor of any message. See Time Warner Enun't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3(1 957,
969 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (distinguishing "sources" of information from "substance"). The
analogy to copyright is simple: Congress can prefer author-sources to copier-sources.
212 See Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 648. The burden on cable operators was also content neu-
tral, because the reduction in channel capacity available for their own choices operated
across the board and not upon channels with a particular viewpOint. See id. at 645.
21 '1 See, e.g., William E. Lee, Manipulating Legislative Facts: The Supreme Court and the First
Amendment, 72 Tut. L. REv. 1261 (1998); Comment. Constitutional Substantial Evidence Re-
view? Lessons from the Supreme Court's Broadcasting Decisions, 97 Comm, L. REv. 1162
( 1997); Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment Cases After Turner
Broadcasting, 111  HARv. L. REV. 2312 (1998).
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Congress be attentive to fact-findin0 14 The Court stated that its "sole
obligation" was to assure that Congress drew reasonable inferences
based on substantial evidence, because Congress is better equipped
than the courts to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data in-
volved in complex regulation. 215
One implication of this reasoning is that, without data, Congress
is not in a better position to draw reasonable inferences than the
Court. 216 Unaided speculation is not enough; Congress at least needs
some help speculating. The Court may also . have been influenced by
the fact that economics and technology played large roles in Turner,
whereas the justification for regulation in O'Brien was essentially based
on the psychology of draft dodging. In cable regulation, and in copy-
right, there are clear economic principles that explain the
justification for the regulation, although the application of those
principles may be hotly contested.
Possibly, as in Turner II, a speech-protective justification for regu-
lation will make the Court's scrutiny less exacting than it would have
been had the law been enacted to protect children from corruption.
When speech interests exist on both sides of an issue, the courts must
tread carefully. They cannot just analyze the reasonableness of the
restriction, and they cannot assume that they know better than Con-
gress even if there are content-based elements to a regulation. If
speech is opposed to speech, a decision not to regulate, or to regulate
in some other way, will also have content-based results. If the standard
for legislation is set too high, speech will actually suffer, as it probably
would if the Court struck clown the Copyright Act in its entirety; if the
standard is too low, interest groups may capture the legislature and
overprotect some speech at the expense of other speech. (This is what
has occurred for years with copyright term extension, expanded
rights of various sorts, and legal protection for anti-copying measures
that prevent even fair uses.)
2" See Thrner 11, 520 U.S. at 191-95. Essentially, the 'Dower cases applied the standard
rule that a content-neutral regulation will be sustained if it advances important govern-
mental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substan-
tially more speech titan necessary, but took the requirement that the regulation actually
advance the identified government interest more seriously than O'Brien had See, e.g., id. al
191 (referring to Congress's "explicit factual findings" and predictions codified in the
statutory statement of purpose).
215 id, at 195.
216 SeeCommelit, supra note 213, at 1175-76.
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III. CODA: A FEW IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT
Just as copyright's free speech justifications have implications for
the evaluation of other speech restrictions, free speech has implica-
tions for copyright. In the next few pages, I hope to offer a few exam-
ples of those implications, though many other things could be said.
Reconceiving copyright as speech-promotion law helps us understand
not just how to make copyright efficient at what it does, but what it
should do.
For example, I began this Article with a discussion of copyright's
vagueness. I conclude, perhaps surprisingly, that vagueness is the nec-
essary price of the benefits of copyright. (And the same might be true
of other speech-promoting speech regulations, though the evidence is
much less clear.)
Similarly, rethinking copyright as a speech-promotion device has
several implications for fair use; I will only discuss one. The fair use
preference for "noncommercial" uses should take account of what
general First Amendment law recognizes, which is that speech for
profit is not necessarily robustly "commercial." Much profit-seeking
speech is nonetheless easily suppressed or deformed, and commer-
ciality as it has been understood in fair use doctrine should be nar-
rowed in a manner more consistent with general free speech law.
Finally, I suggest a framework for evaluating copyright's effects on
speech that takes account of Congress's ability to find relevant facts,
an endeavor that Turner puts at the center of free speech analysis and
that will be vital for any other speech-promoting speech regulation.
A. The Importance of Vagueness
The problems of vagueness discussed in Part I seem particularly
problematic given that there are speech interests on both sides of any
copyright dispute. Assuming that people are generally risk averse, 217
vagueness chills speech on both sides, although vagueness is almost
217
 Even if insurance can make some entities risk-neutral, all that is really required to
make this argument work is that sonic entities arc risk-averse and that they are randomly
distributed between the universes of potential copyright plaintiffs and potential defen-
dants, universes which overlap. Volokh and McDonnell discuss the possibility that copy-
right liability is just a cost of doing business, not a drag on speech. As with libel law, expan-
sive copyright will deter even risk-neuu -al entities from producing material with a lower
profit potential because of the risk of liability, thus changing (perhaps even decreasing,
when investors shift from newspaper to toilet paper) the kinds of speech available. See Vo-
lokh & McDonnell, supra note 57, at 2448.
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universally discussed as detrimental to the interests of a copier. 2 t 8 We
get less original production because authors (and their publishers)
cannot be certain of capturing enough of the gains of creativity, and
we get less copying because legitimate users cannot be sure they will
he able to fend off infringement claims. This seems like a lose-lose
situation.
Eugene Volokh and Brett McDonnell have offered one way for
courts to decrease First Amendment-copyright tensions. Appellate
courts could review de 110V0 findings of infringement where the case
rests on substantial similarity. They argue that this practice would al-
low the circuits to build a body of case law that would enhance pre-
dictability. 219 They take as models to be emulated the appellate-court-
supervised development of the law of fair use, libel and defamation,
obscenity, and the Fourth Amendment. •
This list, however, does not really recommend itself as a set of
models of adjudicative deliberation and clarity. In fact, every one of
these areas is pretty much a mess, the Fourth Amendment most of all,
despite the fact that appellate courts spend appalling amounts of time
and paper sorting out Fourth Amendment cases. 220 Even if libel and
the like formed coherent bodies of law, I am not sure how well the
lesson would apply. Libel, defamation, and obscenity lack the infinite
variety of copyright. In libel and defamation, the actual malice re-
quirement does most of the speech-protective work, and the doctrine
is further limited to the subset of speech that is widely understood to
be damaging to the target. Obscenity is confined to the graphically
sexual; the potential variations between challenged publications are
on the order of "Insert Tab A into Slot B." In copyright, by contrast, it
is difficult to understand how a finding in one case will aid others in
any but the vaguest of ways. Substantial similarity rests on comparing
the plaintiffs work to the defendant's, not to any social consensus or
paradigm work. Volokh and McDonnell do not actually offer any vi-
sion of what concrete, explicit principles of substantial similarity
might look like, and their silence highlights the difficulty involved
when trying to analogize from an infringement case over 12 Mon-
218 See sup-a note 58 and supra note 79. Volokh and McDonnell are the first to recog-
nize the vagueness problem on both sides. SeeVolokh & McDonnell, supra note 57, at 2449.
I suspect this belated recognition stems precisely front the increasing convergence of copy-
right's "speech on both sides" paradigm with the radical theories of speech.
219 SeeVolokli &McDonnell, supra note 57.
2211 See William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
firstice, 107 YALE 14 1 (1997).
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keys221
 to one over The Devil's Advocate Are four points of similarity
enough? How does similar color stack up - against similar shape? 222
Whatever predictability results from the Volokh and McDonnell pro-
posal would largely stem from the numbers—there are fewer potential
three-judge panels than juries. 225
The attempt to decrease uncertainty substantially is futile, be-
cause vagueness in defining the scope of copyright is the price we pay
for speech. 224
 Arguably, most vagueness law serves to contract the
number of situations in which the government can punish speech, as
it is harder to define punishable speech than to identify it in practice.
In copyright, though, it would be very difficult to live without an
idea/expression distinction or a fair use exception. More certain re-
gimes (no copyright at all, for example) would be even worse for
speech.225
B. Commercial Speech: Turning Two Meanings into One
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union gives some guidance about what other aspects of a First
221 See NV oods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Stipp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
222
 The copyright lawyers consulted by Volokh and McDonnell seem fairly split on the
question of whether more appellate review of idea/expression cases would help. Some
thought that nothing would clarify the distinction. SeeVolokh & McDonnell, supra note 57,
at 2456. One thought that "the more cases decided, the more likely it is that you can find a
rationale for your arg lllll ent because not all courts are going to agree." Id. at 2457 (quot-
ing Blaine Greenberg). David Nimmer thought that life would be easier "if there were
fewer benchmark cases." Id.
225 Cf. Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 57 (discussing copyright lawyers' reasons for
paying more attention to circuit court cases than to district court cases). That's not pea-
nuts, but its not terribly principled either.
224
 Cf. Weinreb, Fair Use, supra note 79, at 1309 (arguing that unpredictability cannot
be eliminated front fair use because the doctrine is inherently m u ltifaceted and situation-
dependent).
225
 My defense of vagueness 'resembles the argument in Dan NI. Kahan, Ignorance of
Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96 NlicH. L. Rxv. 127 (1997). Kahan argues that
vagueness in the criminal law is often a good thing, because it encourages moral behavior
rather than immoral adherence to the letter of the law. Copyright's vagueness may be de-
sirable inasmuch as bright-line rules would be more destructive of authors' incentives
(whether as primary creators or as users of elements of copyrighted material). One
significant distinction between Kihan's argument and mine is that Kahan sees the "chill-
ing" effect of vague criminal laws as a good thing, whereas I suspect that the dangers cre-
ated by copyright are a necessary price for flexibility. However, Kahan's argument that
good citizens should ask themselves whether their conduct is right, as well as whether it is
lawful, resonates in copyright. Copyright may be easiest to obey when it tracks our moral
norms about ownership, plagiarism, and rights in one's own books and tapes. See Weinreb,
Fair Use, supra note 79, at 1307-08.
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Amendment-influenced copyright would look like. 22° The Court
struck down portions of the Conimunications Decency Act which ex-
posed people and entities using the Internet to liability if minors
could access indecent speech. In the process, the Court's opinion re-
peatedly emphasized the dangers posed by the Act to noncommercial
speakers, for whom the profit motive did not operate as a counterbal-
ance to the threat of liability and who would therefore be more easily
deterred from speaking than commercial speakers. 227 This reasoning
suggests a free speech justification for narrowing the commerciality
prong of fair use.
The current explanation of the commercial/noncommercial part
of the fair use test states that commercial uses are more likely than
noncommercial uses to capture the copyright owner's market. Not
only is this highly debatable—certainly repeated and widespread non-
commercial use can eliminate a potential market, say for videotapes of
popular shows or sound files of popular recordings 228—it also faces
substantial baseline problems defining what exactly the copyright
owner's "market" should be. This explanation invites claims that, if
liability is imposed, a market authorized by the copyright owner will
develop; these claims then produce the conclusion that economic
harm is caused by the challenged use because the authorized market
never materializes. 229
The circularity of the market-based argument creates a need for a
better justification, and free speech has it in standard explanations for
regulating commercial speech. Commercial speech is robust enough,
because of the profit motive, to generate a broad range of works. 2" A
defendant whO believes that she has made a commercially successful
product may be more willing to litigate a potential infringement,
whereas a defendant making a noncommercial use will likely have
226 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
227 See id. at 850.
228 The current distinction also invites mills 10 stretch the meaning of "commercial"
when they really mean that a noncommercial use may cause market Itrin. See, e.g., World.
wide Church of God v. Philadelphia (Attire!' of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding that copying religious text that was given away was "commercial" because it at-
tracted new members to a church); A M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Stipp. 2d 896
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding individuals' free music file-sharing "commercial" because carried
out on a large scale among strangers).
229 See, e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 937 (2d Cir. 1995)
( Jacobs, J., dissenting); Weinreh, Fair Use, supra note 79, al 1296.
250 Cf. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public SerN% Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 11,6
(1980); Va. Stale Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vu. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 ti.24
(1976).
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neither the resources nor the inclination to risk a large judgment
against her. But this would also invite courts to look more carefully at
what a "commercial" use is. Not every part of a publication is "com-
mercial" in the same way, even when the publisher wants to make
money; advertisements are commercial speech in First Amendment
law but the news stories right above them in the newspaper are not."'
A publisher is probably more willing to suppress the content of any
particular story for fear of liability, whether for copyright infringe-
ment or another reason, than to suppress an ad. Therefore, unless
near-verbatim copying is at issue—suggesting that the publisher is get-
ting commercial advantage from copying and has not done anything
else to attract consumerscourts should not let profit-seeking weigh
very heavily in a non-advertising commercial use. And courts should
be leery of imposing any liability for nonprofit uses, because they are
more fragile and easily suppressed.
This interpretation would bring the meaning of "commercial" in
copyright closer to its meaning in free speech law. In copyright,
"commercial" use is defined broadly, as any speech disseminated for
profit. Although the Supreme Court in Campbell rejected the proposi-
tion that a profit-seeking use is presumptively unfair when the use is
also transformative, it did not reject the idea that anything that peo-
ple pay for is commercial use as far as copyright is concerned. By con-
trast, in the First Amendment context commercial speech is deter-
mined by three factors: whether the speech is au advertisement;
whether it refers to a specific product or service; and whether the
speaker has an economic motive for the speech. 232
There is an underlying relationship between commerciality in
free speech and in copyright. The first two factors of the free speech
test have less to do with the justification for lessened protection for
commercial speech—its robustness—than the third. The first two fac-
tors instead cabin the principle of commercial robustness against the
expansion of speech regulation. If the speech is an advertisement that
refers to a specific product or service, it may be easy for the speaker to
communicate its core message even in the presence of government
regulation. In other cases, the core of the message may not have
much intrinsic relationship to the commercial motive, as when a pub-
lisher chooses to publish books it believes will be best-sellers, regard-
less of whether the topic is Chicken Soup for the Teenage Soul or 101 Uses
231 See 44 Liquor:nail, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
232See Bolger v. Young Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
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for a Dead Cat. Where the message and the motive have a looser rela-
tionship, the content of speech is vulnerable to government-induced
deformity even though the speaker intends to keep saying something
despite regulation. Thus, such speech is not "commercial" in general
free speech law; it is noncommercial speech for profit.
Noncommercial speech for profit is the speech on which copy-
right's incentive function operates. Advertisements do not need the
inducement of copyright; the profit to be gained from selling the un-
derlying goods would support Madison Avenue in any event. Copy-
right is designed to encourage precisely those creators (or, more ac-
curately, those investors in creative work) who want to make money
and whose profit motive is not as strongly tied to the message of the
copyrighted work.
We can therefore identify three kinds of message-motive connec-
tions. For ads, the message is "buy X," and the motive is profit from
selling X. For general speech sold in the market, the message varies
and the motive is profit from selling the speech, and maybe proselytiz-
ing, too. Finally, for nonprofit speech, the message varies and the mo-
tive is something other than profit. 233 The first class of speech is par-
ticularly robust, 234 although the Supreme Court has recently
cautioned that the government still needs substantial justification to
regulate it.
The second class is susceptible to deformation and needs greater
protection from regulation. 235 Government regulation of such speech
may he particularly disturbing for the very reason that a profit-
motivated speaker may keep speaking, only with different content, if
the government regulates speech. The market will appear robust and
free, but it will be pervaded by government-induced distortion. Profit-
"3 CI Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253. 1262 (2d Cir. 1986); William F.
Patty & Shim Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARoozo
Alas & ENT. Lj. 667,679-81 (1993) (suggesting a continuum of commerciality).
2S1 cf. Leval, supra note 80, at 1116 n.53 ("Perhaps at the extreme of commercialism,
such as advertising, the statute provides little tolerance ibr claims of fair use.").
3S5 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.. 510 U.S. 560, 585 (1904) (holding that
commercial use weighs against a finding of fair use, hitt it is only one factor and "even the
force of that tendency will vary with the context"); Maxione-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1262 (hold-
ing that "the commercial nature of a use is a matter of' degree" and that an anti-abortion
hook sold for profit was first and foremosl a work of political opinion such that its com-
mercial character did not weigh against a finding of Pair Ilse); Wojnarowicz v. American
Family Ass'n. 745 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.V. 1990) (holding that, while a fundraising mo-
tivation for a political pamphlet hat! some cOlninercial purpose, its preeminent purpose
was to express a political viewpoint, and the latter purpose outweighed the commerciality).
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seeking should therefore not inherently weigh against the defendant
in a fair use analysis.
The third class lacks even a generalized profit motive and is likely
to be particularly fragile and deserving of heightened scrutiny when
regulated. The absence of profit suggests that the motive has some-
thing to do with the specific message being communicated, which de-
serves special consideration in a free speech analysis. 236 Noncommer-
cial copyright uses may have market effects, but they still deserve
special favor because they represent communication that could easily
be suppressed. 237
C. histitutional Competence
Who will decide where to draw the line, Congress or the courts?
Though courts will defer' to congressional judgments about many fac-
tual situations, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
the judiciary must ultimately determine whether laws are consistent
with the First Amendment. Where First Amendment interests com-
pete, however, the difficulties are compounded. Assuming that copy-
right contains some speech-enhancing elements, a range of possible
regimes could work, depending on an assessment of the empirical
234
 Distinguishing message 6 .ont motive can also distinguish various types of ads.
Therefore, I disagree with the statement in Campbell that parodying a work to advertise an
unrelated product is entitled to less protection than the sale of a parody for its own sake.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585. An ad that evokes copyrighted material to make an unrelated
product attractive, such as a beer ad that satirizes ads for batteries, see Eveready Battery Co.
v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. III. 1991), or imitates a rap group's perform-
ance, see TM Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), is
arguably more deserving of lair use protection than an ad for a product that itself contains
copyrighted work and trades on the appeal of that work to sell the product, see Dallas Cow-
boy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979). An ad
can potentially try to sell beer and lampoon social phenomena at the same time. If the
Coors family can donate beer money to political causes, it should also be allowed to get
extra bang for its advertising bucks by social commentary in ads—the advertising version
of doing good by doing well. Cf. Nitta Munk, Levi's Ongoing Quest for Street Cred, FORTUNE,
Feb. 1, 1999, at 40 (discussing Levi's campaign in which young people talk "frankly" about
cutting school mul the benefits of inequality under capitalism).
297
	 true believer, of course, may well continue to proselytize (or infringe) no mat-
ter what' the sanctions; punishment may even scent like vindication to him. See Negativ-
l•nd, supra note 55. But many people may not. have the ability to continue to communicate
their messages if their websites are shut down or their presses forfeited. They may continue
to believe, but their beliefs will not be readily available to the rest of us.
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validity of claims about encouraging rewards for creativity versus al-
lowing creators to draw on what has come before. 238
The Court has rejected suggestions that it should evaluate the
extent of a patent monopoly to determine whether it was the best way
to promote the useful arts. 23° The Court emphasized the explicit con-
stitutional grant of power to Congress: "When as here the Constitu-
tion is permissive, the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can
come only from Congress." 24° Yet in Graham v. John Deere Co., the
Court held that the Copyright and Trademark Clause is
both a grant of power and a limitation. ... [Congress may
not] enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the in-
novation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby.
Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of pat-
ents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from
the public clotnain„or to restrict free access to materials al-
ready available. 241
Most recently, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the
Court held that the constitutional scope of copyright contained a re-
quirement of originality; Congress was not free to allow copyright in
facts or in non-original works. 242 It is difficult to imagine that a copy-
right of infinite term would be constitutional, and Congress could
probably not enact a copyright law in the old English censorial form,
giving exclusive rights (and ensuring profitable production) only to
2sa In Turner 1, Justice Kennedy found that congressional judgments arc entitled to
substantial deference, but that courts must still exercise independent judginent when First
Amendment rights are at issue. He defined the judicial obligation as assuring dint "Con-
gress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence." 512 U.S. 622, 666
(1994); see also Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note I, at 405 (arguing that courts should
not disrupt congressional judgment about the particular balance in copyright cases).
239 See Deepsonill Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
2.0} Id. at 530.
"I 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
241 See 499 U.S. 340 (1991). Jane Ginsburg has argued that Congress.can do under the
Commerce Clause what it may not do under the Copyright Clause, at least for factual
compilations such as yellow pages. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other
Protection of Works of Information Mer Fels( v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLDS 1. L. RE v. 338, 367-
84 (1992). I assume for my purposes that if the First Amendment invalidates a particular
vision of copyright, a similar law passed under the Commerce Clause would also fail. Given
the Speech-promoting (Unctions of copyright, we should be suspicious of attempts to make
information policy through the Commerce Clause When Me copyright power appears in-
adequate.
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state-approved works. 243
 If a court were to determine that Congress
had failed to identify a speech-based justification for some aspect of
copyright and the law suppressed more speech—maybe a lot more—
than it promoted, it would be obligated to tell Congress to try again.
With limited empirical evidence at hand, Congress would need at
least a persuasive economic theory to explain why its preferred copy-
right regime did not limit substantially more speech than necessary. 244
The justification would not, however, require that each work pro-
tected increased the incentive to speak, since the marginal contribu-
tion of any one work is minimal. Instead, the effect of a decision to
grant rights in the copyright owner or in the user should be general-
ized, to see what the effects on speech would be if a right or a use be-
came widespread. 245
 As Justice Souter recently suggested in the cam-
paign finance context, "the quantum of empirical evidence needed to
satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary
up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification
raised."246
Jessica Litman has examined the legislative history of the 1976
Copyright Act, and concludes that Congress adopted compromises
between industry groups. Producers and large consumers of informa-
tion such as libraries were represented, and ordinary viewers and
readers were not. The result was expansive definitions of copyright
holders' rights coupled with narrow exceptions to protect the few in-
243 See United Christian Scientists v. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs., 829 F.2d 1152 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (rejecting a congressional attempt to extend the copyright in Mary Baker Etkly's
works for an extra period as unconstitutional favoritism toward religion). Bid see San Fran-
cisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (discuss-
ing various supenintellecural property rights that have been granted to favored organiza-
tions such as the U.S. Olympic Committee).
244 In Jane Ginsburg's opinion, for example, Congress can supply content to the Copy-
right Clause by defining the limits of copyright. See Ginsburg, supra note 242, at 375-82.
Yet note how uncertainty worked for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Without evi-
dence of widespread suppression of religious practices, Congress was not allowed to ex-
pand protection for religion beyond that which courts were prepared to give. See City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In the case of copyright, a claim that authors will
have to stop writing if they cannot get more years of exclusive rights, strengthened per-
formance rights or the like cannot really suffice to justify expanded protection. Instead,
courts should demand rigorous findings from Congress that adequately set forth the rea-
sons for altering the balance. Cf. College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (finding evidence of trademark infringement by states
insufficient to justil• abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
243 See Mitchell Bros. Film Corp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir.
1979) (holding that Congress can find that a class of works promotes the useful arts with-
out requiring proof that each work in the class does so).
2 51 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 120 S. Ct. 897, 900 (2000).
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formation users at the bargaining table. 247 Congress, and individual
members, did not understand or even agree with the particulars of
the law adopted. Rather, the legislature brokered a series of deals be-
tween industries and then wrote them into law. 248 This is not our ideal
of policymaking, and it does not fit the Turner vision of serious con-
gressional consideration of the values at stake. The process was
probably a goOd way of allocating copyright ownership as between the
various contenders (authors, publishers, etc.) who were all repre-
sented, but it was abad way of defining the scope of copyright against
other parties. 249 This history, and the similar genesis of industry-
sponsored legislation to increase rights in information in years since,
provides another reason for courts to scrutinize specific assertions of
rights against information-users with greater care, 250
The Turner cases suggest that Congress needs credible evidence
that its copyright law enhances speech. A speech-sensitive analysis
would make expansions of copyright owners' rights such as the addi-
tion of moral rights to copyright, protection for derivative works, and
the recent retroactive extension of the copyright term 251 look highly
suspect.
247 See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL,
L. Ray. 857 (1987) [hereinafter Litman, Compromisel; see ntso Jessica Litman, Revising Copy-
right Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. Ray. 19, 22-23 (1996) [hereinafter Litman, Revis-
248 Sometimes even the industry members who agreed on compromise positions did
not agree on what those provisions Meant. See Litman, Compromise, supra note 247, at 877,
887-88.
249 See id, at 894-95.
220 See Robert G. Deiticola, Freedom to COpy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1685-86 (1999). History
should make us particularly leery when a Congress pressured by established media indus-
tries tries to protect them from new media, Which have in the past thrived in the absence
of specific regulation. See Ulna's, Revising, supra note 247, at 27-29; see also Home Recording
of Copyrighted Works: Hearings 'refine the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil. Liberties, and the Admini-
stration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong. (1982) (testimony of Howard
Wayne Oliver, AF RA) (testifying that audio and video tape recording had to he curtailed
to save movies and TV). New media usually mean neW market participants, new voices and
new listeners, see ',hum, Revising, supra note 247, at 29; this connection to tile First
Amendment's diversity-promotion goal should not be ignored because of fears that estab-
lished firms will not be able to compete.
251 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Suit. 287 (1998) (codified at scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.). See Netanel, SUM. note 63, at 369; Nitinner, Copyright, supra note 16, at 1193
("[W]hen we consider copyright protection beyond the life expectancy of the author's
children and grandchiklren the balance between speech and copyright must shift. The
real. if relatively slight, speech interest in expression remains constant, while the copyright
interest in encouraging creativity largely vanishes."). Nimmer's assessment of the balance
of incentives is probably biased in favor of copyright; given the present discounted valise of
the revenues that will accrue to an author's grandchildren, even if' the copyright remains
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CONCLUSION
Copyright poses a serious First Amendment problem. It restricts,
speech pervasively and powerfully, and its contours are ill-defined. Its
saving grace is that it is better for free speech than its absence would
be. This article made the First Amendment case against and for copy-
right, concluding that copyright is justified as a way for government to
promote  a wide range of speech. Nevertheless, copyright's wide-
ranging effects on speech require careful balancing so that the needs
of future creators are not lost in the name of protecting the property
rights of those who have already spoken.
The implications of taking market-based and incentive theories
seriously can justify the Supreme Court's new approach to evaluating
speech-generating regulations in the Turner cases. Although the Court
treated must-carry as a free speech issue, not a property ownership
issue, the Court clearly saw a market opposed to a government regula-
tor rather than a soapbox-pounding speaker fighting Big Brother. Ca-
ble operators are not very much like orators or authors in the Roman-
tic sense. They are shopkeepers who price and deliver a product. As
such, treating must-carry as a problem of potential market failure and
monopoly made sense. But, because the problem was also a First
Amendment problem—having appeared after the First Amendment
became a significant constraint on government action rather than be-
fore, like copyright—the Court applied a higher standard to this mar-
ket regulation than it does when non-speech markets are at issue.
Like must-carry, copyright is about economics and speech. The
challenge of reconciling modern constitutional doctrine on economic
and social regulation with modern free speech doctrine may be the
most serious constitutional difficulty of our time. Copyright forces us
to recognize that government has an essential role to play in creating
the conditions for speech. Furthermore, that government role is
predicated on specific judgments about the value of broad classes of
speech, and has systematic effects on content and expression. If gov-
ernment intervention and value judgments are inevitable, free speech
inquiry should not focus on the necessity of government intervention,
a useless debate, but rather on the kinds of value judgments that are
acceptable in distinguishing speech that may be prohibited—in copy-
right, infringing speech—from speech that will be protected against
and by government intervention.
quite valuable throughout a lengthened term, the incremental incentive to creativity of a
• copyright that extends much after an author's death is vanishingly
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The conceptual separation between copyright and free speech
doctrine stems from a general assumption that speech as free speech
is not about profit but about politics or self-expression, while people
using speech as a profitable commodity have no real investment in its
actual content. Although the reality is that the same words often play
both roles, a speech claim is created by characterizing words as mat-
ters of private choice, while a copyright claim is created by character-
izing them as salable property. The challenge of modern copyright
law is to explain how words can be both meaningful and profitable,
protected speech and protected property.
